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t Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; J.D., University of California
at Davis; A.B., University of California at Los Angeles; Recipient, Member of the New
York bar since 1970.
The 1991 article on New York Civil Practice is dedicated to Evans V. Brewster in
honor of his seventeen years of outstanding service as the Surrogate of Westchester
County.
Judge Brewster is a former member of the White Plains Common Council and the
Westchester County Board of Supervisors. He also is a past president of the Westchester
County Bar Association and was a distinguished family court and county court judge
prior to his election as Surrogate in 1973. Judge Brewster has earned the respect and
affection of the bench and bar of New York. He has also received kudos for his illustrious service as president of the National College of Probate Judges and for his contributions as a faculty advisor to the National Judicial College.
Judge Brewster has been a long-standing supporter of Pace University and its Law
School. He has been a frequent lecturer at many of the law school's continuing legal
education programs and has been a steadfast VIP at most of our receptions for important
dignitaries. Judge Brewster's excellence on the bench, coupled with his modesty and
quiet strength, have earned him the deep respect and friendship of students, faculty,
deans and alumni of Pace University.
Now that he has returned to private practice as counsel to a distinguished White
Plains law firm, we wish him happiness and success. We will continue to rely on his
indispensable advice and wise counsel. A d Multos Anos Surrogate Brewster.

Heinonline - - 42 Syracuse L. Rev. 343 1991

344

Syracuse Law Review

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

[Vol. 42:343

Parts 1I.D. and III ........................... 358
Concurring Opinion of Justice White .......... 358
Concurring Opinion of Justice Brennan ........ 359
Concurring Opinion of Justice Stevens ......... 360
Eflect of Burnham's Constitutional
Consideration in New York .................... 360
B. Bases or Exercise of Jurisdiction .................. 361
1. CPLR 301: General Jurisdiction .............. 361
2. Long Arm Jurisdiction ........................ 364
a CPLR 302(a)(l) ........................... 364
b. CPLR 302(a)(3)........................... 366
C Forum Non Conveniens .......................... 367
I . CPLR 327(a) ................................. 367
2. Forum Non Conveniens In Federal Court ..... 368
3. Choice of Forum .............................. 369
D. Statutory Requirements For Service Of Summons .. 370
1. Strict Compliance ............................. 371
2. Non-Resident Witness At Traverse Subject To
Jurisdiction ................................... 375
3. Substituted Service On Alleged Criminal
Contemnor Does Not Violate Due Process
Clause ........................................ 376
V. STATUTEOF LIMITATIONS
............................ 378
A. Foreign Object Exception .......................... 379
B. CPLR 214-a: The Continuous Treatment
Doctrine .......................................... 381
C CPLR 203(b)(5) .................................. 382
D. CPLR 214-a: DeJinition Of The Term "Medical
MalprQctice " ..................................... 383
E. CPLR 202: The Borrowing Statute ............... 384
I;: Uniform Federal Statute of Limitations for Some
Private Securities Actions .......................... 384
VI. RES JUDICATA........................................ 385
A. Background ...................................... 387
B. D'Arata, Zuk, and Sullivan ....................... 389
VII. SANCTION
CASES,MANDATORYCONTINUING
LEGAL
AND COMPULSORY
PROBONO........... 393
EDUCATION.
A. Sanction Decisions ................................ 393
B. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education ........... 398
C Compulsory Pro Bono ............................. 399

Heinonline

..

42 Syracuse L . Rev . 3 4 4 1991

19911

Civil Practice

345

VIII. DISCLOSURE
.......................................... 400
PLEADINGS
AND MOTIONS,VENUEAND APPEALS
.... 403
A. Pleadings and Motions.. .......................... 403
B. Venue and Appeals ............................... 404
X . MISCELLANEOUS
..................................... 405
A. Opting Out of Class Actions.. ..................... 405
B. Law School Dismissals ............................ 406
C. Arbitration Clauses ............................... 406
D. Legal Malpractice Claims.. ....................... 406
E. Emotional Distress: First Appellate Ruling On
Injury ............................................ 407
F. Contingency Fees ................................. 407
G. Claims by Terminated Law Firm Partners.. ....... 407
H. Law School Enrollments and Bar Examinations ... 407
I. Small Claims Court Not Bound By Formal
Procedure ........................................ 408
J. Special Masters .................................. 408
........................................ 408
XI. CONCLUSION

m.

During the Suwey year, the New York Court of Appeals issued
important opinions with respect to strict compliance for service of
process,l the foreign object exception under CPLR 214-a,2 and disclosure against corporate employees.3 The Court also imposed sanctions
for the first time under Part 130 of the Uniform rule^,^ and ruled that
issue preclusion could be given to a criminal conviction to preclude
subsequent civil litigation.5 In addition the Court recognized that
substituted service could be used against a criminal ~ontemnor.~
New
York appellate courts issued instructive decisions regarding long-arm
jurisdiction,' forum non conveniens,8 and discovery of surveillance

1. See infra notes 237-248 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 301-317 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 489-498 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 419-431 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 383-401 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 275-294 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 172-173 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 184-187 and
accompanying text.
8. See infa notes 197-211 and accompanying text.
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videos.9 The Legislature also enacted amendments that affect General
Municipal Law 205(e),lO preferences," Article 78,12 traverse hearings,13 court-annexed arbitration,l4 defaultsy15health care proxies,l6
and forfeiture.17 The Governor also signed legislation affecting notices of claim and statutes of limitation in wrongful death actions
against a variety of public authorities.18
There were also several important federal decisions and federal
legislation of which the New York bench and bar should be aware.
The United States Supreme Court issued opinions pertaining to personall9 and subject matter jurisdi~tion.~~
The Court also made important rulings with respect to venuey21res judicata,22 discovery,23 and
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Rule 11 ~anctions.2~
adopted a uniform federal statute of limitations for private securities
claims25 and clarified use of the sixty day service toll in federal
courts.26 The court also analyzed what constitutes "doing business"

9. See infra notes 499-501 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
11. See N.Y. CIV.PRAC.L. & R. 3403(a)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1991) [hereinafter
N.Y. CPLR](gives trial preference to plaintiffwho is terminally ill when the illness arise

out of the wrong for which the action is commenced).
12. See N.Y. CPLR 7804(g) @lcKinney Supp. 1991) (Article 78 proceedings that
relate to the substantial evidence question must be transferred to the appellate division;
the 1990 amendment explicitly directs the supreme court to dispose of only those objections that could terminate the proceeding).
13. See UNIFORM RULESOF THE COURT208.29 (McKinney 1990) (requiring any
process server testifying at a traverse hearing to bring all records pertaining to service to
the courthouse with his license if the server is licensed).
14. See N.Y. CPLR 3405 (McKinney Supp. 1990) (permitting the rules on courtannexed arbitration to raise the ceiling from $6,000 to $10,000 in the New York City
Civil Court).
15. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
16. See Act of July 22, 1990, ch. 725, 1990 MCKINNEY'S
SESS. LAWSOF N.Y. 1539
( d i e d at N.Y. PUB.HEALTHLAWart. 29-c (McKinney Supp. 1991)). The Act will be
effective on January 18, 1991 and relates to designation of agents to make health care
decisions for individuals who are incapable of making those decisions.
17. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 90-142 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 68-88 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 63-65, 524-528 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 364-369 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 486-488 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 432-438 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 346-355 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 328-333 and accompanying text.
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under CPLR 301.27 Finally, on December 1, 1990, President Bush
signed into law the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.28 The Act
implements recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee and changes practice in federal court in a number of important
areaS29
There were also important developments regarding mandatory
continuing legal education3O and mandatory pro bono.31

Space limitations prevent inclusion of an appendix summarizing
all CPLR legislation enacted during the Survey year. The practitioner
should review the table of contents for the various CPLR publicati0ns.3~The most important statutory development is the Federal Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.33 Prior to discussing the Act, the
bench and bar should be alerted to several changes in various New
York State statutes.
A. New York General Municipal Law

Last year's Survey commented on Chapter 346 of the Laws of
1989 which gave a special cause of action in favor of police officers
injured in the line of d ~ t y . 3We
~ stated that the new provision should
be applied retroactively. The law became effective on July 12, 1989,
and courts immediately began to differ as to whether it was retroactive. At least three lower courts held the statute to be remedial and
thus retroactive.35 On the other hand, the Appellate Divisions for the
See infm notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
See infm notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
See id.
See infm notes 461-470 and accompanying text.
See infm notes 471-478 and accompanying text.
The complete text should be available for review in the 1990 CPLR publications
by Matthew Bender, Gould Publications or West's McKinney Commentaries. Copies of
the entire legislative texts may be obtained by contacting the Department of Governmental Relations. The practitioner should also consider subscrib'ig to the Annual Legislative
Bulletin of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The Bulletin analyzes the
merits of the proposed bills and discusses their impact on current laws. It is an excellent
research tool and will keep the practitioner abreast of developments in Albany well in
advance of the Survey's publication.
33. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, effective December 1, 1990.
L. REV. 63,
34. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey of N.Y. Law, 41 SYRACUSE
66-67 (1990) [hereinafter Civil Practice, 1989 Survey].
35. See Brez v. McMellon, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1990, at 27, col. 4; Starkey v. Tran27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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First and Fourth Departments held the statute was not retroactive.36
Both appellate divisions seemed to concede that the statute was remedial but stated there was no clear legislative intent to warrant retroacOn July 26, 1990, Governor Cuomo signed new
tive appli~ation.~~
legislation38 which clarities the ambiguity in the previous amendment
and creates a window of opportunity to sue until June 30, 1991 for
those actions which were dismissed on or after January 1, 1987 because the section was not effective. The "window" also applies to
claims that would have been actionable subsequent to January 1, 1987
had the section been effective. A state court of claims has held that
the new reversal law may be unconstitutional.39

B.

Wrongful Death Actions

Chapter 804 of the Laws of 1990,40 effective August 25, 1990,
provides for a uniform two year statute of limitations for wrongful
death actions against all authorities. The new legislation also provides for a uniform one year plus 90 day limitation for those public
authorities which have no existing statute of limitations pertaining to
causes of actions for personal injury. The law also incorporates the
time limits of section 50-e of the General Municipal Law for service of
notices of claim against public authorities.41

camp Contracting Corp., 152 A.D.2d 358, 548 N.Y.S.2d 722 (2d Dep't 1989). See also
Carlucci, The Firemen's Rule and its Application to Police Oflcels, 17 WESTCHESTERB.
J. 33 (Winter 1990).
36. See Ruotolo v. State, 157 A.D.2d 452, 549 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1st Dep't 1990);
Guadagno v. B. & 0.R. R. Co., 155 A.D.2d 981, 548 N.Y.S.2d 966 (4th Dep't 1989).
37. See Ruotolo, 157 A.D.2d at 453, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 23; Guadagno, 155 A.D.2d at
981, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
38. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW 5 205-e (McKinney Supp. 1991).
39. See Spencer, OBcers Again Fail to Win in State Claim, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 26, 1990,
at 1, col. 6 (discussing decision by Court of Claims Judge Benza in Santangelo v. New
York, Claim No. 81400 and Kilschenheiter v. New York, Claim No. 81401 to not apply
the revival statute to their claims because a final judgment dismissing them had previously been entered).
40. See Act of July 25, 1990, ch. 804, 1990 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1607
(codified at N.Y. PUB.AUTH.LAW5 2981 (McKinney Supp. 1991)). This bill is a significant step toward bringing a degree of uniformity to the numerous and unpredictable
short statutes of limitations against public authorities and corporations.
41. See Bauman, New Bill Affects Wmngful Death Actions, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 23, 1990,
at 2, col. 6 ("The b
i
d does not go so far towards uniformity as to change all existing
statutes of limitations for commencement of suit in actions for personal injuries to a
uniform one year plus 90 days now contained in General Municipal Law 504, and
Public Authorities Law 5 1212 (2)(4).").

Heinonline - - 42 Syracuse L. Rev. 3 4 8 1991

19911

Civil Practice

349

C Court of Claims Procedure
Section 11 of the Court of Claims Act relates to filing, service
and contents of claim, and notice of intention, and sets out the manner of service of a claim or notice of intention, to file a claim.42 Section 10 sets forth the time requirements.43 Chapter 625 of the Laws of
199044 amends section 11 so that objections to noncompliance with
requirements for time or manner of service are waived unless raised
with particularity, either by a motion to dismiss made before service
of the responsive pleading is required, or in the responsive pleading.45
The amendment should diminish prior uncertainty and eliminate the
possibility of unfair surprise.&

D. Default Judgment
Chapter 419 of the Laws of 1990 amends CPLR 3215 by adding
a new paragraph 4 to subdivision (f).47 This addition provides that
when a default judgment is sought on the grounds of non-appearance
against a domestic or authorized foreign corporation, an &davit shall
be submitted that an additional service of summons by first class mail
has been made upon the defendant corporation at its last known address at least twenty days before the entry of judgment.48 The requirement is not applicable to cases in the small claims part or
commercial claims part of any court, or to any summary proceedings
to recover possession of real property, or to actions affecting title to
real property.49

42. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT 8 11 (McKinney 1989).
43. See id. $ 10.
44. See Act of July 18, 1990, ch. 625, 1990 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1322
( d i e d at N.Y. CT. CL. ACT 5 11 (McKinney Supp. 1991)).
45. See id. The new bill regularizes and clarifies the time constraints of Section 10
and the personal and certified mail service requirements of Section 11.
46. Prior to the enactment of the b
id there was some confusion as to whether the
service requirements of Section 11 related to subject matter or personal jurisdiction.
Somejudges had held that Section 11 requirements related to personal jurisdiction, which
meant they were waivable, while other judges applied the Court of Appeals decision in
Finnerty v. New York State Thruway Auth., 75 N.Y.2d 721, 550 N.E.2d 441, 551
N.Y.S.2d 188 (1989), to require that they be viewed as issues of subject matter jurisdiction and not waivable.
47. See Act of July 10, 1990, ch. 419, 1990 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 995
( d i e d at N.Y. CPLR 3215(f)(l) (McKinney Supp. 1991)).
48. See id.
49. See id.

Heinonline

--

42 Syracuse L. Rev. 349 1991

350

Syracuse Law Review

E.

pol. 42:343

CPLR 217

Chapter 457 of the Laws of 199050extends the four month statute of limitations to actions complaining about conduct that would
constitute a union's breach of its duty of fair representation. It is applicable to any action or proceeding against an employee organization
subject to article fourteen of the civil service law or article twenty of
the labor law, which complains that the employee organization has
breached its duty of fair representation to someone to whom the organization has a duty. The statute requires that these actions shall be
commenced within four months of the date the employee or former
employee knew or should have known of the breach.51

E

Forfeiture Laws

Chapter 655 of the Laws of 1990,52 effective November 1, 1990,
enacts a sweeping revision of the state's forfeiture laws. The law incorporates the provisional remedies of CPLR 13-A, which permit prejudgment seizure of a defendant's assets without the explicit requirement of a due process probable cause hearing.53 Nonetheless, a due
process hearing may be required, at least prior to the seizure of real
property.54

G. Additional Items
The practitioner may also wish to become familiar with new
amendments relating to jury tria1,55 small claims court actions56 and
50. See Act of July 10, 1990, ch. 467,1990 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1087
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 217 (McKinney Supp. 1991)).
5 1. See id.
52. See Act of July 18,1990, ch. 655,1990 MCKUWEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1358
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 1311 (McKinney Supp. 1991)).
53. See id.
54. See United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., Live
nia, N.Y., 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989), in which the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that a due process hearing was necessary prior to the seizure of real property.
55. See N.Y. CPLR 4102 (McKinney Supp. 1990). Subsection (a) of CPLR 4102
had been construed by the courts to hold that a party who filed a note of issue without a
jury demand was unable to object when another party filed a jury demand but later determined to withdraw it. The new amendment to subsection (a) requires the other party to
obtain consent of the filer of the note of issue prior to withdrawing the demand. Thus,
the amendment overrules prior contrary case law. Id
56. See N.Y. CITYCIV.
CT.ACT 5 1801-A (McKinney Supp. 1991) (raises the monetary jurisdiction of commercial small claims parts in the civil, district and city courts
from $1,500 to the maximum amount permitted in small claims court, currently $2,000).
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income execution.57

H. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990
This Act was passed by Congress in the midst of its final late
night budget reconciliation session of October 27-28, 1990.58 The Act
is an omnibus statute which consists of eight separate titles. Each title
is referred to by name as a separate "Act."
Title I is the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. It provides for an
expanded process to reduce delay in civil litigation in the federal
courts. Title I1 is the Federal Judgeship Act of 1990. It authorizes 11
new circuit judgeships and 74 new district judgeships, and gives permanent status to some existing judgeships that were previously only
temporary. Title I11 is the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990. It includes important changes to the law of
supplemental jurisdiction, removal, venue and appellate jurisdiction.
It also introduces changes to the limitations period applicable to
claims and actions when supplemental jurisdiction has been invoked
and to the limitations period for civil actions arising under newly enacted federal statutes. Title IV is the Judicial Discipline and Removal
Reform Act of 1990. It makes changes in the procedure for the investigation of complaints of judicial misconduct. Title IV also creates a
national commission to review issues involving the tenure of Article
I11 federal judges, including discipline and removal. The remaining
four titles do not relate to the operation of federal courts. They are:
Title V (Television Program Improvement Act of 1990); Title VI (The
Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990); Title VII (Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act); and Title VIII (Computer Software
Rental Amendments Act of 1990).
Title I11 of the Act is particularly important to the New York
practitioner. Section 310 adds new section 1367 to Title 28 of the
United States Code.59 Section 1367, effectiveonly as to civil actions
which are commenced on or after December 1, 1990, creates supplemental jurisdiction. This jurisdiction includes pendent claim and ancillary jurisdiction and specifically repudiates Finley v. United States60
57. See N.Y. CPLR 5231 (McKinney Supp. 1991) (income from all sources, and not
just earnings, is subject to the ten percent income levy).
58. See Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). See also Giuffra, The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 204 N.Y.L.J. 122, Dec. 26, 1990, at 1, col 1.
59. See Pub. L. 101-650, 5 310, 104 Stat. 5089, 51 13-14 (1990).
60. 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (on an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the United States
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by authorizing pendent party jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction
is prohibited over persons made parties or seeking to become parties
under Civil Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24 when exercising jurisdiction over
such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. section 1332.61 Section
31162 amends 28 U.S.C. section 1391 relating to venue in federal civil
actions. The provision for venue based on the residence of the plaintiff is repealed. Under the former rule, venue was established in a
judicial district in which the defendant or all defendants reside and in
a district in which a substantial part of the claim arose. As a result of
the amendment, venue in federal question actions is broadened beyond the defendant's residence and the place where a substantial part
of the claim arose to include a new provision pertaining to "venue by
necessity." This permits venue in a judicial district where any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.63
Title I11 also affects removal jurisdiction. Section 312 amends 28
U.S.C. 1441(c) to limit the predicate separate and independent claim
to one that is within the federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C.
section 1331.64 Thus if removal is effected under newly amended section 1441(c), the district court has discretion to remand only matters
in which state law predominates.65 Title I11 also affects statute of limitations. Section 313 enacts a general four year statute of limitations
respecting civil actions arising under Acts of Congress that do not
specifically set forth a period of limitati0ns.6~This provision applies
only to causes of action arising under legislation which Congress enacts after December 1, 1990. Title 111 also relates to rules governing
finality under 28 U.S.C. section 1291. Congress currently authorizes
appeal as of right from all final decisions of the district courts under
28 U.S.C. section 1291. Section 315 amends the Rules Enabling Act
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, refused to allow a San Diego woman whose family died
in a 1983 airplane crash to sue the federal government, San Diego, and a utility company
in one federal lawsuit).
61. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1332 (Supp. 1990) (providing for diversity subject matter jurisdiction between citizens of different states if the amount in controversy is at least
$50,000).
62. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1391 (Supp. 1990).
63. See Pub. L. 101-650, $311, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114 (1990).
64. See id. $ 312, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114 (1990).
65. See id.
66. See id. 8 313,104 Stat. 5089,5114-15 (1990). The federal law does not incorporate applicable state tolls and extensions.
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to permit the Supreme Court to determine by rule instead of case law
the terms and conditions under which district court decisions will be
considered final and appealable under section 1291."

There are three important opinions by the U.S. Supreme Court
that affect subject matter jurisdiction.68 In addition, the newly enacted Judicial Improvements Act of 199W9 repudiates the Supreme
Court's recent holding in Finley.70
In Carden v. Arkoma Associates,71 the Supreme Court held that
the citizenship of all partners in a limited partnership, rather than
citizenship of general partners alone or the state where the partnership is created, governs determinations of whether diversity of citizenship exists for federal jurisdictional purposes.72 The Carden decision
was recognized by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Curley v. Brignoli.73
In Port Authority v. Feeney,74 the Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the Second and Third Circuits by ruling that the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey was not immune, as a state
agency under the eleventh amendment, from suits in federal c0urt.7~
In a unanimous opinion, the Court affirmed a decision by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit which permitted two personal injury
suits by Port Authority employees to be filed in Manhattan federal

67. See id. 8 315, 104 Stat. 5089, 5115 (1990).
68. See Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990); TaWin v. Levitt, 493
U.S. 455 (1990); Port Authority v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990).
69. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
70. 490 U.S. 545 (1989). See Pub. L. 101-650, § 310, 104 Stat. 5089,5113-14 (1990).
71. 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990).
72. Carden, 110 S. Ct. at 1021.
73. 915 F.2d 81 (2d Ci.1990) (Second Circuit noted that Carden answered in the
affirmative the question whether, in a suit brought by a limited partnership, the citizenship of the limited partners must be taken into account to determine diversity of citizenship among the parties).
74. 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990).
75. Id. at 1873-74.
76. Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority of five, stated that the New York and
New Jersey Legislatures had agreed, when they created the bi-state agency in 1921, to
waive any immunity to federal lawsuits that the states may enjoy. Thus, she held that the
eleventh amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which protects states from federal lawsuits, was not applicable to the Port Authority. Four justices stated that they would go
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Last year's Survey77 promised to track Taflin v. Levitt.78 The
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that state courts have jurisdiction to hear civil lawsuits brought under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations A ~ t . ~We
9 also analyzed Finley,80
where the Supreme Court purported to bury pendant party jurisdiction.sl During the Survey year, New York federal judges applied Finley differently.82 In Aetna Casualty & Surety v. Spartan Mechanical,83
Judge Bartels concluded that, in light of the Finley decision, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the third
party claims for contribution or indemnification, since they lacked an
independent jurisdictional basis and were not within ancillary juris~ Huberman v. Duane Fellows,85 Judge Leidiction of the ~ o u r t . 8In
sure held that the Finley doctrine was not applicable to a third party
defendant.86 On December 1, 1990 President Bush signed into law
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.87 Section 310 of Title I11 of
the Act adds a new section 1367 to Title 28 of the U.S. Code. This
section applies only to actions commenced after December 1, 1990
and specifically authorizes pendent party jurisdiction. It impliedly repudiates Finley.88

further and permit the Port Authority to be sued in federal court even if the states had
not consented.
77. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 85.
78. 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990).
79. In 1988 the New York Court of Appeals held in Shnpson Elm. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 450, 530 N.E.2d 860, 534 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1988), that New York
State courts shared subject matter jurisdiction with the federal courts over civil claims
brought under RICO. See Carlisle, N.Y. Civil Practice, 1988 Survey of N.Y. Law, 40
SYRACUSE
L. REV. 77, 95 (1989) [hereinafter Civil Practice, 1988 Survey].
80. 109 S. Ct. 2003. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 85.
81. Finley involved an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Pendent jurisdiction was sought against the municipal and utility defendants on state claims. The United
States Supreme Court had previously rejected pendent jurisdiction in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. l (1976) but left open the issue of whether pendent party jurisdiction could
exist if a federal claim was within the exclusivejurisdiction of a federal court. In Finley,
the Court held that absent an independent base for subject matter jurisdiction against one
of several defendants, dual litigation will be required.
82. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Spartan Mechanical Corp., 738 F. Supp. 664
(E.D.N.Y. 1990); Huberman v. Duane Fellows Inc., 725 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
83. 738 F. Supp. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
84. Aetna, 738 F. Supp. at 664.
85. 725 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
86. Hubeman, 725 F. Supp. at 204.
87. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
88. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1367 (1991).
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IV. PERSONAL
JURISDICTION

A.

Constitutional Limitations on In Personam Jurisdiction

Prior Surveys have discussed some of the relevant constitutional
considerations necessary for the assertion of jurisdiction in New
York.89 During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court
analyzed these considerations in Burnham v. Superior Court of California.90 Burnham merits discussion because of its approach to the
doctrine of minimum c0ntacts.9~It also serves as another example of
how a defendant personally served or tagged in New York is subject
to the in personam jurisdiction of our c0urts.9~
The Burnham facts are simple. Dennis Burnham married
Francie Burnham in 1976. In 1977 they moved to New Jersey where
two children were born. In July of 1987 the Burnhams separated.
Mrs.Burnham moved to California with custody of the two children.
The Burnhams agreed that she would file for divorce on grounds of
irreconcilable differences. Nonetheless, in October of 1987, Dennis
filed for divorce in New Jersey on the grounds of desertion but failed
to make service of process upon Francie. In January of 1988, Francie
filed for divorce in California but did not make service on Dennis.
Thereafter, Dennis traveled to California on business and visited his
children in the San Francisco area where Francie resided. Dennis
took one child away for a weekend trip and upon return to Francie's
home, was served with a summons and copy of the divorce action.
Dennis returned to New Jersey and later in the year made a special
appearance in the California superior court to challenge the court's in
personam juri~diction.9~
The California courts found that Dennis was subject to jurisdict i ~ n The
. ~ ~U.S. Supreme Court accepted certiorarig5and found that
89. See Carlisle, A! Y. Civil Practice, 1987 Survey of A! I: Law, 39 SYRACUSE
L.
REV. 75, 88-98 (1988) [hereinafter Civil Practice, 1987 Survey] (analyzing the United
States Supreme Court decision in Asahi v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102
(1987). See also Carli.de, A! Y. Civil Practice, 1986 Survey of A! Y. Law, 38 SYRACUSE
L.
REV. 67, 85-88 (1987) [hereinafter Civil Practice, 1986 Survey] (analyzing the United
States Supreme Court decision in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
90. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
91. See infra notes 84-134 and accompanying text.
92. See J. WEINSIZIN,H . KORN& A. MILLER,NEW YORKCIVILPRACTICE
KORN& MLLER].
$301.10 [hereinafter WEINSTEIN,
93. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109 (1990).
94. Id.
95. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. 47 (1989).
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jurisdiction existed; however the Court adopted different views of
when presence constitutes a jurisdictional predicate.96 First, the plurality focused on an historical evidence and consensus or common law
historical pedigree approach. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained in Parts I, 11-A, B, C, D97 and I11 that
transient presence alone was sufficient for a jurisdictional base. Second, Justice White, who joined the plurality in all respects except for
Parts 11-D and I11 of the opinion, concurred in the judgment. He
explained that in limited circumstances the Court could find that
presence alone was not sufficient for jurisdictional purposes.98 Third,
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor concurred in
the judgment but found that presence alone was not enough for an
assertion of in personam jurisdiction.99 They concluded that it was
necessary to conduct an independent due process inquiry.lm Fourth,
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and explained that he
could join neither Justice Scalia's nor Justice Brennan's opinion in the
case.lol Justice Stevens stated that the historical evidence and consensus identified by Justice Scalia, the considerations of fairness identified
by Justice Brennan, and the common sense displayed by Justice
White, all combined to demonstrate that the case was an easy one.lo2
Justice Stevens also observed that "[plerhaps the adage about hard
cases making bad law should be revised to cover easy cases."lo3

I. Parts II-A, II-B, and II-C
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and Kennedy, concluded that the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment does not deny a state court's jurisdiction over
a nonresident who was personally served with process while temporarily in that state when the suit is unrelated to his activities in the
state. lo4
(a) The plurality explained that in determining whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process, the
96. Id. at 2116-17, 2119-20, 2126.
97. Id. at 2109-19.
98. Id. at 2119-20.
99. Id. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring).
100. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120-21.
101. Id. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119 (plurality opinion).
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Supreme Court has long relied on the principles traditionally followed
by American courts in marking out the territorial limits of each
state's authority. The plurality admitted that the classic expression of
that criterion appeared in International Shoe v. Washington,los which
held that a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction must not
violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."l06
Nonetheless, the plurality explained that the International Shoe holding was not intended to be applicable to cases where jurisdiction was
based on presence.107
(b) In Part 11-B, the plurality explained that a formidable body of
precedent, beginning with common-law antecedents and extending
through decisions at or near the time of the fourteenth amendment's
adoption, reflected the almost unanimous view that service of process
confers state-court jurisdiction over a nonresident who is physically
present, regardless of whether he was only in the state on a transient
basis or whether the cause of action is related to his activities there.108
(c) In Part 11-C, the plurality rejected the petitioner's challenge
to the old rule that presence alone is sufficient as a jurisdictional predicate.109 In this respect, petitioner had argued that in Shafler v. Heitner the Court had adopted sweeping language which held that all
assertions of jurisdiction must be pursuant to the minimum contacts
standard of International Shoe.111 The plurality explained that the
International Shoe standard was developed by analogy to the traditional physical presence requirement. The new standard served as a
means of evaluating novel state procedures for assertion of in personam jurisdiction over absent defendants.112 The plurality noted
that these novel procedures were developed primarily with respect to
state long-am statutes whereby a nonresident defendant could be
subjected to judgment only as to matters that arise out of or relate to
his contacts with the forum state.1l3 The plurality held that nothing
in the International Shoe case or its progeny supported the proposi-

105. 326 U.S.310 (1945).
106. International Shoe, 326 U.S.at 316.
107. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
108. Id. at 2110-13.
109. Id. at 2113.
110. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
1 1 1. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 21 13 (discussing International Shoe v. Washington, 326
U.S.310 (1945)).
112. Id. at 21 14-15.
113. Id.
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tion that a defendant's presence in the forum state is itself not a sufficient jurisdictional predicate. l4

2. Parts II-D and III
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, concluded that Shafler 115 must be strictly limited to its
facts and that Justice Brennan's proposal to apply an independent due
process inquiry constituted a break with the International Shoe
standard.116
(a) Justice Scalia explained that when read in context, Shafer's
statement that "all assertions of state-courtjurisdiction must be evaluated according to the [InternationalShoe] standards,"ll7 was intended
only to apply to quasi in rem jurisdiction. Justice Scalia admitted that
the Shafler holding was applicable to other forms of in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, but not to defendants who
were present in the forum when served.118
(b) Justice Scalia argued that Justice Brennan's proposal for use
of an independent due process inquiry for all state assertions of jurisdiction was nothing more than a totality of the circumstances test
which would lead to uncertainty and to unnecessary litigation over
the preliminary issue of the court's competence.l19 Justice Scalia explained that each justice would be required to exercise his or her subjective discretion as to what is fair and just. This would lead to a
misuse of judicial resources and result in inconsistent decisions.120

3.

Concurring Opinion of Justice m i t e

Justice White joined Part I and Parts 11-A, 11-B and 11-C of the
plurality's opinion. He explained that the rule permitting an assertion
of in personam jurisdiction on the grounds of presence alone is so
widely accepted that he could not possibly strike it down, either on its
face or as applied to the Burnham facts, on the ground that it denied
due process of law. Justice White went on to note that the Court does
have power under the fourteenth amendment to examine even tradi114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 2115.
433 U.S. 186 (1977).

Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 21 17.
Id. at 2116.
Id.
Id. at 21 19.
Id. at 2117.
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tionally accepted procedures and declare them invalid.121 He recognized the sweeping language of Shafler '22 but argued that it would be
applicable only if a forum's jurisdictional rule was so arbitrary and
lacking in common sense in so many instances that it should be held
~ ~ White noted that unviolative of due process in every ~ a s e . 1Justice
til such a showing is made, claims that the rule would operate unfairly
as applied to a certain nonresident need not be heard.124 If the defendant's presence in the forum is intentional, that is enough for Justice White. His common sense approach was based on a desire to
avoid endless, fact-specific litigation in the trial and appellate
courts. 125
4.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Brennan

Justices Breman, Marshall, Blackmun and O'Comor concurred
in the judgment but argued that presence alone does not automatically comport with due process simply by virtue of its pedigree. Justice Brennan agreed that history is an important factor in establishing
whether a jurisdictional rule satisfies due process requirements, but
posited that an independent inquiry into the fairness of the prevailing
in-state service rule must be undertaken.126
Justice Breman noted that the transient jurisdiction rule will
generally satisfy due process requirements because the rule is consistent with reasonable expectations and is entitled to a strong presumption that it comports with the fourteenth amendment.127 Since
Dennis Burnham availed himself of significant benefits provided by
the forum state, it was foreseeable that he could expect to litigate
there. Justice Breman also pointed to a variety of procedural devices
that could ameliorate any burdens that might arise.1z8 Finally, Justice
Brennan argued that the Scalia approach was foreclosed by the
Court's holdings in International Shoe and Shafler.129

121. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119 (White, J., concurring).
122. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
123. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 2120.
125. See id.
126. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
127. See id. at 2124.
128. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2125.
129. See id. at 2120.
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Concurring Opinion of Justice Stevens

Justice Stevens explained that he did not join the Court's opinion
in Shafler 130 because he was concerned by its unnecessarily broad
reach. He explained that the same concern prevented him from joining the Scalia or Brennan approach in Bumham. He criticized Justice
Scalia's suggestion that when and if a jurisdictional rule becomes substantively unfair or even unconscionable, the Court has no power to
alter it.131 Justice Stevens also questioned Justice Scalia's reliance on
individual states to limit or abandon bases of jurisdiction that have
become obsolete.132 Justice Stevens explained that states have little
incentive to limit rules such as transient j~risdiction.13~
Finally, Justice Stevens noted that the reasoning of Justice Scalia's opinion was
strikingly oblivious to the raison d'etre of various constitutional doctrines designed to protect out-of-staters, such as the Art. IV Privileges
and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause.134

6. Eflect of Burnham's Constitutional Consideration in New York
It has been long recognized in New York that any person served
with a summons while physically present in the state is subject to suit
in New York on any claim.135 Although this aging doctrine has been
, ~ ~ is
~ no New York decision which
questioned by some C O U ~ ~ Sthere
has held to the contrary. If a nonresident defendant is tagged with
process, even if the action is unrelated to his temporary presence in
New York, our courts will have in personam jurisdiction.137 This rule
has two exceptions. A person is not deemed present in the state for

130. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
131. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring).
132. ShafTer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
133. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218-19.
134. Id. See also U.S. CONST.art. N,5 2; U.S. CONST.art. I, 9 8, cl. 2.
supra note 92, at 5 301.10.
135. See WEINSTEIN,KORN& MLLER,
136. Some courts have concluded that transient jurisdiction did not survive Shaffer
v. Heitner. See Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 46-47 (3d Cir.
1985); Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1088-91 @. Kan. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979); Harold M. Pitman Co. v.
Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 310-14 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Bershaw v.
Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 657, 700 P.2d 347, 349 (1985). See also Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The '%werW Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65
YALEL.J. 289, 293-303 (1965).
137. See Alumina1 Indus. v. Newtown Commercial Assoc., 89 F.R.D. 326
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Opert v. Schmidt, 535 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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purposes of process service when he was induced to enter by fraud,138
and he is immune from process when he is voluntarily in the state to
attend a civil or criminal litigation whether as plaintiff, defendant or
witness.139 Also, the rule is subject to the discretionary power of the
courts under CPLR 327140 to decline jurisdiction.141 It remains to be
seen if New York courts will reject transient presence when the facts
of a given case show unfairness, involuntariness, inconvenience or
similar circumstance.. It is highly likely that New York courts will
apply the forum non conveniens doctrine to minimize unfairness. In
this respect, New York courts are generally unwilling to dismiss cases
under CPLR 327(a) when the plaintiff is a New York resident.142
B. Bases or Exercise of Jurisdiction
I. CPLR 301: General Jurisdiction143
The traditional bases for the exercise of jurisdiction that developed prior to the adoption of the CPLR were incorporated into it by
CPLR 301.144 Thus, personal jurisdiction based on physical presence,l4Uomicile,l46 consent,14' or "doing business"l48 permits New
York courts to assert jurisdiction over a defendant for any cause of
action irrespective of whether it arises from the defendant's contacts
138. See generally WEINSTEIN,KORN& MILLER,CPLR MANUAL5 304[a] (1986
ed.) [hereinafter CPLR WAL].
139. Id.
140. See N.Y. CPLR 327(a) (McKinney 1990).
141. Even if a New York court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction, CPLR
327(a) gives the court discretionary power to dismiss the case. Under CPLR 327(b),
however, dismissal is highly unlikely if the action arises out of a contract agreement or
undertaking to which section 5-1402 of the General Obligations Law applies if the parties
have agreed that New York law will govern.
142. See infra notes 201-21 1 and accompanying text.
143. See N.Y. CPLR 301 (McKinney 1990).
144. See id
145. Two exceptions should be noted: a person is not deemed present in New York
for purposes of process service when he was induced to enter by fraud, and he has irnmunity from process when he appears voluntarily, as a plaintiff or defendant, to attend proceedings involving criminal or civil litigation. See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying
text.
146. See N.Y. CPLR 313 (McKinney 1990) (New York domiciliary subject to in
personam jurisdiction on any claim, wherever it arises, and regardless of where the defendant is located at the time the summons is served).
147. See N.Y. CPLR 301 (McKinney 1990).
148. See Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260
N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915
(1917).
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with New York.149
The "doing business" concept is frequently used to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign corporation."o Although the Court of Appeals
has stated "[tlhe test for doing business is and should be a simple
pragmatic one . . . ,"Is1 a review of the cases decided during the Survey year indicates that the test, while pragmatic, is far from simple.
Three cases are worthy of comment.
Within a one week period, both the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals agreed that insurance underwriters at Lloyd's of London were not "doing business"
in the state and could not be sued here, despite their substantial interest in a trust fund maintained in a New York bank for the purpose of
~ ~decision to the contrary would have
paying American ~ 1 a i r n s . lA
meant that any multinational company that had a banking relationship with New York could have been found to be doing business here.
The circuit court listed the many contacts appellants had with New
Yorkl53 but noted that since the cause of action did not arise out of
any of them, CPLR 301 was the only possible jurisdictional predicate.lS4 The circuit court explained that in assessing general jurisdiction in New York, courts have generally focused on the existence of
an office in New York; the solicitation of business in New York; the
presence of bank accounts or other property in New York; and the
presence of employees or agents in New Y ~ r k . " ~The circuit court
noted that solicitation of business alone did not justify a finding of
corporate presence in New York.lS6 Appellants argued that under the
solicitation-plus theory157 there was general jurisdiction. They
claimed that the defendants' employees' trips to the United States to
service existing accounts and solicit new ones constituted substantial

149. See Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305,310,434 N.E.2d 692,695,449 N.Y.S.2d
456, 458 (1982).
150. See Laufer at 310, 434 N.E.2d at 695, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
151. See Bryant, 15 N.Y.2d at 432, 208 N.E.2d at 441, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 628-29. Cf:
cases collected and discussed in WEINSITIN, KORN & MILLER,supra note 92, at
301.16.
152. See Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander; Alexander & Alexander Sews.,
Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 28, 565 N.E.2d 488, 563 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1990) and Landoil Resources
Corp. v. Alexander; Alexander & Alexander Sews., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1990).
153. Landoil, 918 F.2d at 1039.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Landoil, 918 F.2d at 1044.
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solicitation and that the following factors met the "plus" portion of
the test: the placement of New York insurance risks in London; the
placement of foreign insurance risks in New York and the circumstance that some of the defendants received substantial revenue from
their New York transactions.158 The circuit court held that the solicitation-plus rule was not a talismanic test for jurisdiction, but instead
was merely a means by which courts have attempted to resolve that
issue.159 The court concluded that the district court did not err in
finding that the record did not establish by a preponderance of the
evidence a sufficient predicate of jurisdiction under CPLR 301. The
New York Court of Appeals reached a similar result in Landoil Resources v. Alexander & Alexander,l60 which came to the Court as a
certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Our highest state court unanimously ruled that the underwriter's indirect interest in the trust fund at Citibank was insufficient
to confer jurisdiction under CPLR 301.I61 Both Landoil decisions
demonstrate that New York State and Federal courts must analyze a
defendant's connections to the forum state "not for the sake of contact-counting, but rather for whether such contacts show a continuous, permanent and substantial activity in New York."l62
In Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines,l63 one key issue before the district court was whether the P.L.O., which is not recognized as a state
by the U.S. government, was "doing business in New York."l64 Judge
Stanton noted that not only does the P.L.O. own a building in New
York City in which its permanent representative and his family live,
but there also were eight other employees residing in the building.165
Judge Stanton also pointed out that the P.L.O. owned an automobile
and maintained a bank account in New York and was listed in the
telephone book.'" Similarly, the judge observed that the P.L.O.'s
permanent representative engaged the media to publicize P.L.O. policies and spoke wherever he could obtain an invitation.167 Judge Stan-~

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

~~

-

-

Id
Id. at 1044.
Landoil, 77 N.Y.2d at 31, 565 N.E.2d at 489, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 740 (1990).
Id. at 35, 565 N.E.2d at 491, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
supra note 138, at 3 304(d).
See generally CPLR MANUAL,
739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Chasser, 739 F. Supp. at 863.
Id. at 857.
Id.
Kliighoffer v. S.N.C. Achiie Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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ton held that the aggregate of these activities constituted doing
business under CPLR 30 1.
2. Long Arm Jurisdiction
CPLR 302168permits New York courts to assert jurisdiction over
nondomiciliary individuals and foreign corporations169 that are not
subject to CPLR 301, but instead have the state contacts listed in section 302.170 This b'long-arm" jurisdiction is limited by the terms of
CPLR 302 and by federal and state constitutional considerations to
claims that arise from the defendant's activity related to New York.171
A review of the personal jurisdiction cases decided during the
Survey year172supports the observation that "long-arm inquiries can
leave the realm of the merely monotonous and become intensely monotonous."l73 Of the many cases interpreting CPLR 302, the following are worthy of brief mention.
a.

CPLR 302(a)(l)

'

Subsection (a) of CPLR 302 specifically excludes from its reach
the tort of defamation. That exclusion is contained in both CPLR
302(2) and (a)(3) covering torts committed both within and outside of
Judge
New York. In Vardinoyannis v. Encylopedia Britanni~a,"~
Leval held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendants
transacted business in New York by mailing allegedly defamatory letters. Judge Leval pointed out that while the contacts were business168. See N.Y. CPLR 302 (McKinney 1991).
169. See Sionson v. Int'l Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 288, 200 N.E.2d 427, 431, 251
N.Y.S.2d 433,438 (1964) ("[allthough the section does not in terms refer to corporations,
its application to foreign corporations, as well as to nonresident individuals, seems
clear.")
170. See N.Y. CPLR 302 (McKinney 1990).
171. See Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadiac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169,
408 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978) (standing for the proposition that the New York Constitution has
a due process clause which the Court of Appeals has held may require more than its
federal counterpart); see also Svendsen v. Smith's Moving & Trucking Co. 54 N.Y.2d
865, 429 N.E.2d 411, 444 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1981).
172. See Firegreen Ltd. v. Claxton, 160 A.D.2d 409, 553 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1st Dep't
1990); Anderson Dev. Co. v. Isoreg, 154 A.D.2d 859, 546 N.Y.S.2d 720 (3d Dep't 1990);
Leiderman Assoc. v. Robotool Ltd., 154 A.D.2d 515, 546 N.Y.S.2d 137 (2d Dep't 1990);
Genicom v. Ekco Group, 160 A.D.2d 551,554 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1st Dep't 1990); Murdock
v. Arenson Int'l U.S.A., 157 A.D.2d 110, 554 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1st Dep't 1990); Don King
v. Buster Douglas, 735 E Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
173. Siegel, The Afliction Known as Long Arm Jurisdiction, 199 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1988).
174. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10881 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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related, they were neither purposeful nor designed to avail the defendant of the forum's protections.175 He also commented that he had
"considerable doubt" whether CPLR 302(1) applied in defamation
~ases.17~
Judge Leval stressed that since subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3)
of the statute specifically exclude actions for defamation, there are
strong arguments that the legislature intended to bar use of the longarm statute in defamation cases. He reasoned that since the purpose
of the exceptions in CPLR 302(a)(2) and (a)(3) was to avoid unnecessary inhibitions on freedom of speech or the press, an extension of
subsection (a)(l) seemed to nullify the protection of
nondomiciliaries.177
There are few cases in New York applying the "contracts anywhere" provision of CPLR 302(a)(1).178 In Melendez v. Professional
Machine &
the question was whether a New York court
could assert jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturing company which
was neither registered to do business nor doing business in the state,
and which did not solicit or have an office telephone or sales representative here. The only contact the defendant had was that it shipped
its product into New York.180 The supreme court found that in addition to shipping its product into New York, the defendant had entered
into the contract here and performed it for several years for a New
York company.181 The supreme court did not address an unsettled
area of the law to determine whether a mere contract to ship goods
FOB to the nondomiciliary seller's place of business provides suf6cient minimum ~ontacts.18~
Once there has been a single contact or contacts between the
nondomiciliary defendant and New York, there must be a showing
that the cause of action is directly related to and arises from the contact.lS3 In Storch v. Vigneau,l84 the appellate division for the First

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id
178. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l) (McKinney 1990); see also Paradise Prods. Corp. v.
Allmark Equip. Co., Inc., 138 A.D.2d 470, 526 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1988) (analyzing
the "contracts anywhere" clause of CPLR 302 in terms of due process requirements required to confer jurisdiction over nondomiciliary who contracts outside of New York to
provide goods or services to New York).
179. 204 N.Y.L.J. 28 (Sup. Ct., Kings. Co. 1990).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See generally WEINSTEIN,KORN& MLLER,
supra note 92, at $5 301-16.
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Department analyzed this requirement with respect to CPLR
302(a)(1)-(3). Pursuant to section 302(a)(l) the appellate division
held that the record was devoid of any evidence that defendant's alleged activities in New York gave rise to the causes of action for
which long-am jurisdiction was sought.185 With respect to 302(a)(2),
the Appellate Division held that the record did not support a finding
that the appellant committed a tortious act within New York.186 The
appellate division also held that the requirements of 302(a)(3) had not
been satisfied, the fact that plaintiff was domiciled in New York and
suffered a loss of income here did not constitute an injury within the
state.

b. CPLR 302(a)(3)
A prior edition of the Survey analyzed the U.S. Supreme Court's
holding in Asahi v. Superior Court of California.188 We also discussed
the question of what guidance the Asahi.opinion provides for the New
York bar.189 During the Survey year, one distinguished state supreme
court judge applied some of the Asahi standards to determine if a nonresident defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in New
York.190 In Beyer v. Pearl Desk,191 Justice Baer held that the Asahi
standards, relating to the "stream of commerce" minimum contacts
test, were dispositive on the issue of jurisdiction. The court dismissed
the action against the manufacturer but found disclosure was necessary to determine if the Asahi fairness test was met by the supplier,
who had a licensing rather than formal distribution arrangement.lg2
Justice Baer's approach reminds the practitioner of the importance of
184. 165 A.D.2d 241, 556 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1st Dep't 1990).
185. Storch, 162 A.D.2d at 241, 556 N.Y.2d at 343.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 242, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
188. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1987Survey, supra note 89, at 88-97 (1988).
189. Id. at 95-98.
190. See Beyer v. Pearl Desk Co., 204 N.Y.L.J.28 (1990) (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1990).
191. Id. (parties did not raise considerations with respect to Part 11-B of the Asahi
opinion, which garnered support of all the United States Supreme Court justices with the
exception of Scalia).
192. Jurisdictional disclosure is available under N.Y. CPLR 321 1 (d) (McKinney
1970). See generally WEINSTEIN,KORN& MILLER,
supra note 92, at 4 301.07, n.39
(citing Peterson v. Spartan Indus., Inc., 33 N.Y.2d 463, 467, 310 N.E.2d 4513, 515, 354
N.Y.S.2d 905, 908 (1974) (proposition that the Court of Appeals favors jurisdictional
discovery)). The bench and bar should note the different standards for disclosure in state
and federal practice. In state courts, a good faith conclusory allegation of jurisdiction
presents a "sufficient start" to entitle the plaintif to disclosure on jurisdictional issues. In
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developing a detailed record for purposes of preventing a dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds.193 CPLR 3211(d) provides for jurisdictional
discl0sure.19~In this respect, it is important to note the different standards for disclosure in state and federal practice. In state courts,
good faith conclusory allegations of jurisdiction present a "suEicient
start" to entitle the plaintiff to disclosure on jurisdictional issues.195
In federal courts, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of
jurisdiction in order to proceed with discovery.196

C Forum Non Conveniens
Even if a New York state or federal court has subject matter and
personal jurisdiction, CPLR 327(a) gives the state court trial judges
discretionary power to dismiss the case.l9' Federal district court
judges have similar discretion. Unlike state practice, the availability
of an alternative forum is an absolute prerequisite for applying the
doctrine to dismiss a complaint in federal court.198 Also, in state
practice CPLR 327(b) prohibits dismissal where the action arises out
of a contract agreement or undertaking to which section 5-1402 of the
General Obligations Law applies.199

I.

CPLR 327(a)2w
The two most important opinions applying CPLR 327(a) are

federal courts, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction in order to
proceed with discovery.
193. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1987Survey, supra note 89, at 97-98 (analysis of
importance of developing record).
194. See N.Y. CPLR 3211(d) (McKinney 1990). This section, entitled "Facts unavailable to opposing party" provides that:
Should it appear from affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion made
under subdivision (a) or (b) that facts essential to justify opposition may exist
but cannot then be stated, the court may deny the motion, allowing the moving
party to assert the objection in his responsive pleading, if any, or may order a
continuance to permit further affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had
and may make such other order as may be just.
See also Sedig v. Okemo Mountain, 204 N.Y.L.J. 27 (1990) (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1990)
(advertising by Vermont ski resort warranted discovery as to jurisdiction).
195. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
196. Id.
197. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 467 N.E.2d 245, 478
N.Y.S.2d 597 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985).
198. Islamic Republic, 62 N.Y.2d at 474, 467 N.E.2d at 245, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
199. See N.Y. CPLR 327@) (McKinney 1990).
200. See N.Y. CPLR 327(a) (McKinney 1990).
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Highgate Pictures v. DePaul201 and Avnet v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety.202In Highgate the trial court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss onforum non conveniens grounds, finding the action had little
connection with New York.203 The contract was largely negotiated in
California.204 It was also executed in California and governed by California law.205 In addition, the alleged breaches and torts occurred in
London and India.206 The appellate division reversed the trial court
basing its decision not to applyforum non conveniens on two grounds.
First, it found that the trial court abused its discretion in not conditioning the grant of the motion on the availability of an alternative
forum.207 Second, the appellate division placed great emphasis on the
defendant's onerous burden when the plaintiff is a New York resident.
The First Department stated, "A New York resident plaintiff will not
be deprived of its home forum unless it plainly appears that New
York is an inconvenient forum and that another is available which
will best serve the ends of justice and the convenience of the parties.' "208 In Avnet, the First Department affirmed the dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint on forum non conveniens grounds. The plaintiff
had sued on incidents occurring at out-of-state waste sites. The appellate division stated that the issuance of insurance policies were issued
was b;t one factor to be considered and did not automatically make
Thus, if the plaintiff is a
New York the most convenient forum2.@'
New York resident it appears that New York courts will be unlikely
to grant a dismissal under CPLR 327(a) unless the cause of action is
absolutely unrelated to our state.210Also the onerous burden of proof
is on the moving party.211
2.

Forum Non Conveniens in Federal Court
In Borden v. Meiji Milk Products,212 the Court of Appeals for the

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

153 A.D.2d 126, 549 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1st Dep't 1990).
160 A.D.2d 463, 554 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1st Dep't 1990).
See Highgate, 153 A.D.2d at 128, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
Id.
Id.
Id
Highgate, 153 A.D.2d at 128, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
Id. at 129, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 388 (citations omitted).
Avnet, 160 A.D.2d at 464, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 135-36.
See id. at 464, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
See Highgate, 153 A.D.2d at 129, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 388.
919 F.2d 822 (2d Cu. 1990).
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Second Circuit reminded the bench and bar that the simple uniform
standard of Gulf Oil v. Gilbert 213 permits reversal of aforum non conveniens determination only when there has been a very clear abuse of
discretion by the district
The circuit court held that the Gulf
standard, which relates to the district court's consideration of the private interests of the litigant and the factors of public interest, places
heavy reliance on the discretion of the district court in balancing the
Gulf f a ~ t o r s . ~The
l ~ circuit court also rejected appellant's argument
that the district court erred because appellees failed to meet at the
outset their burden of showing the availability of an adequate remedy
in J a ~ a n . ~The
' ~ Second Circuit stated that it does not matter
whether the district court considers the availability of an adequate
remedy elsewhere at the beginning, the middle, or the end of its written 0pinion.~17
3. Choice of Forum

In Banco de Commercio e Industria de Sao Paulo SA. v. Esusa
Engenharia e Construcoes SA.,218 a Brazilian bank, afier loaning
money to a Brazilian construction company which later went bankrupt, sued the individual Brazilians who guaranteed the corporate obligations. The loan agreement provided that actions could be
instituted in New York.219 Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. The supreme court denied the motion, holding that Gen.
Oblig. Law section 5-1402220permitted a New York action for any
transaction involving more than $1 million, since the nonresidents
had previously agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of a New York
State or federal court.
In Royal Touch v. Home Shopping Network,221 the defendants
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on a purchase order
forum selection clause that gave Florida courts exclusive jurisdiction.
When defendants faxed the purchase order to the plaintiff to buy jewelry, they neglected to fax the back of the form that contained the
213. 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
214. See Borden, 919 F.2d at 827.
215. Id at 828.
216. Id at 828-29.
217. Id.
218. N.Y.L.J., Apr. 30, 1990, at 26, col. 2.
219. Id.
220. See N.Y. GEN.OBLIG.
LAW $ 5-1402 (McKinney 1975).
221. N.Y.L.J., Dec 24, 1990, at 26, col. 4.
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contract language and the forum selection clau~e.22~
The supreme
court found no evidence establishing that the parties expressly agreed
to the forum selection clause.223 The court denied the motion and
held that since the clause was not faxed, New York was the proper
f0rum.22~

D. Statutory Requirementsfor Service of Summons
Prior Survey articles have devoted substantial portions of the jurisdiction section to a recitation of cases showing that New York
courts require strict compliance with service of summons and notice
provisions.225 The legislature has enacted CPLR 312-a,226which provides for service of summons by &st class mai1.227 This experimental
statute, which is modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
will probably be permanently enacted
("FRCP") 4(~)(2)(c)(ll),~~*
disprior to its expiration date of Jan. 1, 1992. Last year's S~rvey22~
cussed the new mailing statute, and we have yet to discover a reported
case analyzing it. It also appears that many plaintiffs' lawyers are not
using the new mailing statute.230Once again we remind the bar that
service by mail has been extraordinarily successful in federal practice.
In this respect we call the reader's attention to Datskow v.
Teledyne,231 wherein the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that Rule 4(f) of the FRCP limits mail service under Rule 4(c) to the
territorial limits of the state.232 Since the enactment of CPLR 312-a,
extraterritorial service of process is now available in federal court
under FRCP 4(e), which permits out-of-state service pursuant to state

222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, I989 Survey, supra note 34, at 92-94; Carlisle, Civil
Practice, 1988 Survey, supra note 79, at 101-07; Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1987Survey, supm
note 89, at 11 1-17; Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1986 Survey, supra note 89, at 93-99.
226. See N.Y. CPLR 312-a (McKinney 1990);see also McLaughlin, Service by Mail
in New York, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 10, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
227. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, I990 Survey, supra note 34, at 89-92, for analysis o f
the new statute.
228. See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 4(c)(2)(c)(ii).
229. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
230. Address by Professor Jay C. Carlisle, Past President's Dinner for the Defense
Association o f New York (Nov. 13, 1990) (copy on file at the Syracuse University College
o f Law, H. Douglas Barclay Law Library).
231. 899 F.2d 1298 (2d Cir. 1990).
232. Datskow, 899 F.2d at 1302.
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Also, the practioner is admonished not to try service by mail
if there are six or fewer months remaining on the applicable statute of
limitations.234
No Survey on New York Civil Practice would be complete without reference to some of the significant decisions which demonstrate
the importance of strictly complying with service stat~tes.~~S
We will
briefly mention a few of these cases and highlight an issue of first
impression as to whether due process requires personal delivery of
process to an alleged criminal contemn0r.23~

I. Strict Compliance
The strict compliance case of the year is the Court of Appeals'
decision in Hick v. Stewart- Warner237 The defendant was a foreign
corporation not authorized to do business in the State of New York.
Plaintiff mistakenly believed that the defendant was authorized to do
business in the State and commenced an action pursuant to Business
Corporation Law 30623* instead of Business Corporation Law 307,239
which governs service on unauthorized corporations. Plaintiff "effected personal service on the Secretary of State at her office in Al-

233. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, absent a state service statute authorizing service by mail, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not
specifically authorize service by mail outside the territorial boundaries of the state
wherein the district court was located.
234. Address by Professor Jay C. Carlisle, New York State Trial Lawyers Institute
CPLR Program (Oct. 20, 1990) (copy of remarks on file at Syracuse Law Review).
235. See Tropeano v. Astoria Gen. Hosp., N.Y.L.J., May 31, 1990, at 30, col. 3
(Sup. Ct., Queens Co.) (medical malpractice suit dismissed for improper service of process); Ferenzo v. Haggerty, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 3, 1990, at 26, col. 6 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co.
1990) (use of CPLR 308 expedient service options must be proven impractical> Caputo v.
Reed, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 1990, at 31, col. 4 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1990) (due diligence
rules must be met before use of substituted service). See also Squiers, Judge Rules Improper Service Void Award Against Khashoggi, N.Y.L.J., June 13, 1990, at 3, col. 1;
Barker, Service of Process on Foreign Corporations, N.Y.L.J., June 26, 1989, at 3, col. 1;
Freed C Brandes, Service of Process and Ancillary Relief, N.Y.L.J., May 30, 1990, at 3,
col. 1.
236. See infm notes 275-294 and accompanying text.
237. 76 N.Y.2d 50, 555 N.E.2d 907, 556 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1990).
238. See N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAW5 306(b) (McKinney 1986) (providing that service
of process on a foreign corporation authorized to do business in New York is complete
when process is served upon the secretary of state).
239. See N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAW5 307 (McKinney 1986) (providing that service of
process on foreign corporation unlicensed to do business in New York shall be sufficient if
notice thereof and a copy of the process are either delivered personally to the foreign
corporation without the State or sent to it by registered mail).
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bany and thereafter [the] defendant received a copy of the process at
its officein
Judge Hancock, writing for the Court, posed
the question as "whether under these circumstances the court acquired personal jurisdiction over defendant although plaintiff did not
send a copy of the process to defendant by registered mail as required
by section 307(b)(2) or file the affidavit of compliance required by section 307(c)(2)."24l The trial court had denied defendant's motion to
dismiss and found that jurisdiction had been acquired. The appellate
division had afErmed.242
Judge Hancock began by stating that "[tlhe question is whether
the procedures established in Business Corporation Law section 307
are requirements of a jurisdictional nature which must be strictly satisfied."243 He distinguished between service on a foreign corporation
authorized to do business in New York and one not so authorized.244
With respect to the former, Judge Hancock noted that service of process in the State was simple: "There are no theoretical uncertainties
concerning the basis for jurisdiction since the foreign corporation is
concededly doing business in the State and, indeed, has applied for
authority for the express purpose of doing so . . . . "245 Judge Hancock noted, however, that service of process for unauthorized foreign
corporations requires much more to assure that the corporation, in
fact, receives a copy of the process.246 Judge Hancock also observed
that "[tlhese are not mere procedural technicalities but measures
designed to satisfy due process requirements of actual notice."247
Thus, the Court of Appeals held that all of CPLR 307 is jurisdictional
and implicitly reminded the bench and bar that all state service statutes are to be strictly constr~ed.2~~
Additional strict compliance cases under CPLR 308249and Vehi-

240. Flick, 7 6 N.Y.2d at 53, 555 N.E.2d at 908, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 51 1.
241. I d
242. Id.
243. Id. at 54, 555 N.E.2d at 909, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
244. Id. at 55, 555 N.E.2d at 909, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
245. Flick, 7 6 N.Y.2d at 57, 555 N.E.2d at 910, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
246. I d at 56, 555 N.E.2d at 909-10, 556, N.Y.S.2d at 512.
247. Id. at 56, 555 N.E.2d at 910, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
248. See also Macchia v. Russo, 67 N.Y.2d 592,496 N.E.2d 680,505 N.Y.S.2d 591
(1986) (Court of Appeals held that there is no reason to extend the clear and unambiguous meaning of service of process statutes). See generally Barker, supm note 235, at 3,
col. 1.; Siegel, Some Warning Flags about Serving Unauthorized Foreign Corporations as
Court of Appeals Construes BCL 307Strictly, 370 N.Y. ST. DIG.,Oct. 1990, at 1, col. 1.
249. See infra notes 251-270.
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cle and Trafic Law section 253250 should be noted. In Broomes-Simon v. Klebanow,251 the Appellate Division for the Second
Department held that substituted service under 308(2)252"leave and
mail" was invalid because mailing to the defendant's actual place of
business failed to comply with statutory requirements that the envelope containing the papers bear the legend "personal and conlidential."253 In Dorfman v. Leidner'254 the Court of Appeals held that
service of process on a member of the defendant physician's office staff
was not proper, even if the office staff misrepresented its authority to
accept service of process.255 In Biological Concepts v. Rudel,256 the
Third Department also held that service of process on defendant's
mother-in-law was not sufficient to allow the court to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the defendant257 Substituted service under CPLR

250. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
251. 160 A.D.2d 973, 554 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2d Dep't 1990).
252. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1990).
253. The appellate division pointed out that "not only did the envelopes in which
the summonses were mailed bear endorsements which arguably violate[d] the statutory
prohibition against indications that the sender is an attorney or that the communication
'concerns an action' against the addressee, they [also] failed to bear the legend 'personal
and confidential' as required by . . . CPLR 308(2)." Broomes-Simon v. Klebanow, 160
A.D.2d at 973, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 696. Thus the appellate division held that "[slince the
plaintiff's process server failed to comply with the conditions prescribed for the mode of
substituted service utilized, jurisdiction over the respondents was not acquired." Id
254. 76 N.Y.2d 956, 563 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1990), afirming Davidson v. Community
Gen Hosp., 158 A.D.2d 748, 551 N.Y.S.2d 340 (3d Dep't 1990).
255. Davidson, 158 A.D.2d at 748-49, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 341. Plaints's process
server averred that he had previously served process on the group of physicians with
which defendant practiced on at least I5 occasions, and on each occasion he had served a
member of the office staff based on the fact that the process server had been told that the
doctors would not come out into the waiting area to accept service, nor would they permit h i to enter the rear offices to serve them personally. Plaintiff's process server also
stated that the office staff had informed h i that they were authorized to accept service
on behalf of the doctors. Nonetheless, the appellate division held that service was not
properly carried out under CPLR 308(1). The appellate division also rejected the plaint s ' s argument that CPLR 308(2) should be applied retroactively to validate the service.
256. 159 A.D.2d 32, 34, 558 N.Y.S.2d 312, 313 (3d Dep't 1990) (service of process
on defendant's mother-in-law was not sufficient to allow court to obtain personal jurisdiction over defendant, even though mother-in-law lived in the same apartment building as
defendant, where server made only one minimal effort to serve defendant prior to leaving
the legal papers with the mother-in-law in her separate apartment).
257. Biological Concepts, 159 A.D.2d at 34, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 313. The appellate
division held that the mother-in-law was a person of suitable age and discretion within
the contemplation of CPLR 308(2) but that the requirements relating to delivery of the
summons to a person at the actual dwelliig place or usual abode of the person to be
served were not met. Id.
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308(2) requires substituted service to a person at the actual dwelling
place or usual place of abode of the person to be served.25* Since the
mother-in-law lived in a different apartment, the service did not
strictly comply with the statute.259
Several decisions during the Survey year demonstrate that CPLR
308(4)260 "nail and mail" is good old unreliable ser~ice.~61In Van
Raalte v. Metz,262 the Appellate Division for the Second Department
held that wedging pleadings in the doorway of defendant's residence
did not constitute "aflixation" to the door of defendant's residence as
required by the ~ t a t u t e . 2Similarly,
~~
in Moss v. Convin,264 the Second
Department held that &davits of service were insufficient because
there was no evidence that the process servers had made any efforts to
ascertain defendant's place of employment or to attempt service
there.265 The Second Department adopted a more flexible approach

258. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1990).
259. Biological Concepts, 159 A.D.2d at 34, 558 N.Y.2d at 313. The appellate division noted that had the process server made more persistent efforts, including more visits
to the defendant's apartment, perhaps the requirements of CPLR 308(2) may have been
met. Id.
260. See N.Y. CPLR 308(4) (McKinney 1990).
261. See Farrell, Good Old Unreliable Service under New York's Nail and Mail Statute, N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (analyzing service under CPLR 308(4) and concluding that it is always hazardous, because it requires proof of "due diligence" to make
service under subsections (1) and (2) of the statute).
262. 161 A.D.2d 760, 556 N.Y.S.2d 112 (2d Dep't 1990).
263. 161 A.D.2d at 760,556 N.Y.S.2d at 113. The process server testified at a traverse hearing that he affixed the pleadings to the door by means of scotch tape. However,
the defendant's wife testified that she found the pleadings wedged in the doorway between
the storm door and the door jamb of the front entrance to the residence. This conflicting
testimony created an issue of credibility which the supreme court determined in favor of
the defendant. The appellate division held that it is well settled that matters of credibility
are best determined by the hearing court, whose decision should not be disturbed if s u p
portable by a fair interpretation of the evidence. Id
264. 154 A.D.2d 443, 546 N.Y.S.2d 15 (2d Dep't 1989).
265. Moss, 154 A.D.2d at 443, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 16. The process server had on two
separate occasions afkied a copy of a summons and verified complaint to the door of the
appellant's residence, and another copy had been mailed to the same address. "The nail
and mail service in each instance was alleged to have been preceded by three attempts to
serve the appellant at his home. Of the six attempts at personal service, all were made on
weekdays during normal working hours, except for one attempt at 9:35 p.m." Id. The
appellate division held that since there was "no evidence in the moving papers that the
process servers had made any efforts to ascertain the appellant's place of employment or
to attempt service there," the affidavits of service were "insufficient, as a matter of law, to
establish that the process servers exercised such due diligence as the statute requires to
permit the use of substituted service under CPLR 308(4)." Id
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to service under CPLR 308(4) in Lugo v. Santiag0.26~In Lugo, the
defendant claimed that he did not reside at a residence where service
was attempted, but the record indicated that residence was the address he provided to police after the automobile accident that was the
subject of the action.267 Defendant also had provided the same address to the Department of Motor Vehicles on his driver's license and
license plate registration forms sometime after service was allegedly
made. Thus the appellate division held the strict compliance due diligence requirements of CPLR section 308(4) had been satisfied.268
In Cummins-Allison v. Bargarnik the Civil Court of the City of
N.Y. for Kings County held that service of process on an out-of-state
motorist was insuflicient where the envelope sent to the motorist by
certified mail return receipt requested was returned with a notation
"Moved forwarding time expired."269 The court noted that there was
no ordinary mailing after return of the certified mailing.27O

2. Non-Resident Witness at Traverse Subject to Jurisdiction
In a prior Survey, we alerted the bench and bar to a decision of
the New York City Civil Court which held that valid re-service of
process on defendants conferred jurisdiction notwithstanding the pendency of motions alleging defective original service.271 Thus, respondents were not immune from re-service while in court contesting the
During the Survey year, Judge Friedman, in anoriginal servi~e.~7~

266. 160 A.D.2d 845, 554 N.Y.S.2d 279 (2d Dep't 1990).
267. Lugo, 160 A.D.2d at 845, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 280. The defendant's sworn statement was that he did not reside at the Brooklyn address at the time service was attempted. The appellate division noted that this was the address he provided to the police
after the accident. Id.
268. Id.
269. 146 Misc. 2d 1042, 1043, 553 N.Y.S.2d 981, 982 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1990).
270. Cummins-Allison, 146 Misc. 2d at 1043-44, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 982. The Civil
Court noted that the manner of service provided by section 253 "is in derogation of the
common law." Id. As a result the statute is to be strictly construed. Thus, where the
certified mailing has been returned with the notation "address unknown" or "address
moved-no forwarding address" or "returned to sender - forwarding time expired" the
courts have found that the requirements of section 253 have not been met. Id. But see
Stefanini v. Hudson, N.Y.L.J., May 17, 1990, at 28, col. 5 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1990)
(service by certified mail satisfies N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.LAW§ 253 if letter is returned
unclaimed).
271. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1988Survey, supra note 79, at 117, n. 327 (discussing Department of Housing Preservation & Dev. v. Koenigsberg, 133 Misc. 2d 893, 509
N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1986)).
272. Koenigsberg, 133 Misc. 2d at 897, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 272 (Housing Judge Lewis
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other thoughtful opinion, ruled that a New York State resident who
does not reside in the City of New York is not immune from service
while appearing at the civil court for a traverse.273The defendant, a
resident of Nassau County, had moved to dismiss the summons and
complaint on the ground that since he did not reside in the city, he
was immune from service while appearing at the civil court for a traverse. The court denied the motion, holding that the defendant was
not immune from service but subject to long-arm jurisdiction under
Civil Court Act section 404.274

3. Substituted Service on Alleged Criminal Contemnor Does Not
Yiolate Due Process Clause
In Morfesis v. Department of Housing Preservation and Development,275the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York was faced with the question of whether the Due Process
Clause of the fourteenth amendment required in-hand delivery of pro~ ~ ~ was charged with
cess to an alleged criminal c o n t e ~ n n o r .Morfesis
violation of seven separate orders of a New York Civil Court Housing
Judge to provide heat and hot water to seven apartment buildings in
Manhattan.277 The Department of Housing Preservation and Development of the City of New York ("I-IPD") served applications for
criminal contempt on Morfesis pursuant to the leave and mail provisions of CPLR 308(2) and section 110(m) of the New York City Civil

R. Friedman held that valid reservice of process on the owners conferred jurisdiction
notwithstanding the pendency of motions alleging defective original service).
273. Sekur Alaxm Co. v. Samuels, 205 N.Y.L.J. 95 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1990).
274. Judge Friedman reasoned that the immunity doctrine is not only applicable to
a person coming to New York from out of state. The doctrine is a privilege extended as a
matter of public policy to facilitate the administration of justice and to induce nonresidents to come into the state to give testimony. Nonetheless, the doctrine is not applied if
the nonresident would be subject to the state's long-arm statute. Judge Friedman concluded that this same reasoning applied to a person not normally subject to the jurisdiction of the civil court but amenable to jurisdiction pursuant to the civil court's long-arm
jurisdiction, which is provided for in the Civil Court Act section 404.
275. 733 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
276. A New York State intermediate appellate court had previously mled, in an
issue of first impression, that leave and mail service was sufficient to commence criminal
contempt proceedings. See Department of Hous. Preservation & Dev. v. 24 W. 132 Equities, Inc., 137 Misc. 2d 459, 461-62, 524 N.Y.S.2d 324, 326-27 (Sup. Ct., App. T., 1st
Dep't 1987).
277. Dep't of Hous, 137 Misc. 2d at 460,524 N.Y.S. at 325; see also Morfesis, 733 F.
Supp. at 746.
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Court A~t.~78
The service was mailed to and left at the address given
to HPD pursuant to the Housing Maintenance Code,279 which requires registration by the person responsible for the maintenance of a
multiple dwelling. Morfesis did not appear at any stage of the contempt proceedings, but an attorney did appear for him.280 Morfesis
claimed that prior to his sentencing hearing, there was no indication
that the attorney was expressly or implicitly authorized to appear on
his behalf.281 He also argued that the Due Process Clause required
personal in-hand delivery service of process to commence criminal
contempt proceedings.282 The Appellate Term for the First Department rejected his claim and held that personal delivery of process is
not required in special proceedings so long as the party charged is
notified of the accusation and is afforded a reasonable time to defend.283 This decision was afErmed by the Appellate Division for the
First Department,z84and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal
and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.2s5 Morfesis then filed
a petition for habeas corpus in federal court.286
Judge Sand noted that, "while several Supreme Court decisions
discuss the issue of notice, none directly address [sic] the need for
personal service of process."287 Judge Sand also found that the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution only requires that a
criminal contemnor have notice of the charges and an opportunity to
defend.288 He concluded that leave and mail service provides such
reasonable notice.289
-

-

-

--

--

-

- --

278. See N.Y. C m CIV.
C'f. ACT 5 1lqm) (McKinney 1990).
279. Article 41 of the Housing Maintenance Code requires registration by the person responsible for the maintenance of a multiple dwelling.
280. Morfesis, 733 F. Supp. at 746.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Dep't of How, 137 Misc. 2d at 459, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 324, 326-27.
284. Dep't of Hous. Preservation & Dev. v. 24 W. 132 Equities, Inc., 150 A.D.2d
181, 540 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1st Dep't 1989).
285. Dep't of Hous. Preservation & Dev. v. 24 W. 132 Equities, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d
841, 545 N.E.2d 872, 546 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1989).
286. Morfais, 733 F. Supp. at 745.
287. Id. at 746. "When the acts in contempt are not committed in open court, [dlue
process of law . . requires that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a
reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation.' " Id (quoting
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925)).
288. Id. at 747.
289. Id. See also Landlord is Sent to Jail for not Providing Heat, N.Y. Times, Mar.
10, 1989, at 29, cal. 1.; Devil Slumlord Behind Bars -At Last, N.Y. Post, Mar. 10, 1990,

.
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The Morfesis decision has important policy implications for the
Civil Court of New York. There are recurring problems with respect
to service of Orders to Show Cause ("OTSC") for contempt in supplementary civil proceedings as a result of the failure of a witness as
judgment debtor to appear on the return date of a subpoena issued
pursuant to CPLR sections 5223 and 5224.z9O The problem arises
when a moving party seeks an OTSC for contempt. When the OTSC
is submitted to the clerk's office at Special Term, Part 2, for signature
by the judge assigned to the part, the clerks insist that the papers
contain "service in-hand" instead of "service pursuant to CPLR section 308."29l Case law has held that service by any method pursuant
to CPLR section 308 is sufficient service and that "in-hand service"
under CPLR section 308(1) is not required.292 Therefore, the service
requirement for OTSC civil contempt cases in Civil Court are more
stringent than those required by statute and the applicable case law.293
This is particularly true since the OTSC requests are for civil contempt and are, therefore, clearly subject to a lower due process standard. The administrative judges of the New York Civil Court should
comply with the law of the state of New York.294

New York courts issued important opinions relating to the continuous treatment doctrine,295 the foreign object exception,296 the borrowing statute,297 the application of CPLR section 203(b)(5) in
at 4, col. 2. See generally Barker, A Review of the Contempt Process, 202 N.Y.L.J. 121
(1989) (presenting outline review of the contempt process in New York State).
290. N.Y. CPLR 5223 - 5224 (McKinney 1990).
291. Id.
292. See supra notes 283-286 and accompanying text. See also Dep't of Hous. Preservation & Dev. of the City of N.Y. v. Arick, 131 Misc. 2d 950, 503 N.Y.S.2d 489
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1986).
293. In Arick,Judge Friedman held that the term "personal service" did not require
"in-hand personal delivery", and that service of an OTSC pursuant to any APLR 308
method would be sufficient. Id. at -, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 492. See also CPLR MANUAL,
supra note 138 (standing for proposition that the term "personal service" does not mean
in-hand delivery of process).
294. See supra notes 283-286 and accompanying text. The issue is what the law
permits rather than what standards the administrative judges deem appropriate.
295. See Jorge v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 164 A.D.2d 650, 563
N.Y.S.2d 41 1 (1st Dep't 1991).
296. See Rodriguez v. Manhattan Medical Group, P.C., 77 N.Y.2d 217,567 N.E.2d
235, 566 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1990).
297. See Singer v. Eli Lilly & Co., 153 A.D.2d 210, 549 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1st Dep't
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federal
and the question of whether an action against hospital staff is governed by a three year or two and one half year statute of
limitations.299 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also
adopted a uniform federal limitations period for some private securities clai~ns.~OO

A. Foreign Object Exception

If a foreign object has been left in the patient's body, the statute
of limitations will not begin to run until the patient could have reasonably discovered the malpractice.301 If the exception applies, the
action must be commenced within one year of the actual or imputed
discovery.302 We have previously pointed out that the Court of Appeals has narrowly applied the foreign object exception.303 During
the Survey year the Court refused to extend the exception to the statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions to include undetected
intrauterine devices.304 This decision resolved a conflict between appellate decisions in the First and Second Departments.305
Judge Titone, writing for a unanimous court in Rodriguez v.
Manhattan Medical Group, I? C ,3M framed the issue as to whether a
"fixation device" originally implanted in a patient's body for a specific
treatment purpose is transformed into a "foreign object" within the
meaning of the foreign object exception when a physician retained to
remove it negligently fails to do so.307The Court reviewed Flanagan
1990), aff'g, Besser v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 146 A.D.2d 107, 539 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1st
Dep't 1989).
298. See Datskow, 899 F.2d at 1298.
299. See Halas v. Parkway Hosp., 158 A.D.2d 516, 551 N.Y.S.2d 279 (2d Dep't
1990).
300. See Ceres Partners v. Gel Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Ci.1990).
301. N.Y. CPLR 214-a (McKinney 1990).
302. Id
303. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, I986 Survey, supra note 89, at 103-04.
304. See Rodriguez, 77 N.Y.2d 217, 567 N.E.2d 235, 566 N.Y.S.2d 193.
305. In Stemberg v. Gardstein, 120 A.D.2d 93, 508 N.Y.S.2d 14 (2d Dep't 1986),
the Appellate Division for the Second Department held that an IUD became or took on
the character of a foreign object when the defendant performed an abortion and tubal
ligation sterilization procedure but negligently failed to remove the IUD. The plaintiff's
medical malpractice action, therefore, accrued when the IUD was or could reasonably
have been discovered by the patient. The Appellate Division for the First Department
took a different position as evidenced by its decision in Rodriguez, 155 A.D.2d 114, 552
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1st Dep't 1990).
306. 77 N.Y.2d 217, 567 N.E.2d 235, 566 N.Y.S.2d 193.
307. Id. at 218-19, 567 N.E.2d at 236, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
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v. Mount Eden General Hospital308 and its pr~geny,~"and then concluded that the foreign object exception was very narrow.310 The
Court also examined the history of CPLR section 214-a and concluded that the legislature intended to limit a foreign object to one
that the doctor does not intend to leave inside the body.311 Thus
Judge Titone held that the IUD did not become a foreign object when
defendants failed to remove it after having been retained to do ~0.312
The Court of Appeals also distinguished IUD cases from its earlier
holding in Flanagan on the following grounds: (1) the IUD claim,
unlike the claim in Hanagan, clearly rested on defendants' alleged
negligence in exercising professional diagnostic judgment or discretion;313 (2) a claim based on injuries arising from a failure to diagnose
such as that asserted by the IUD plaintiffs involves a far more problematic chain of causation than one based on injuries arising from the
negligent implantation of a surgical instrument or other foreign object;314 and (3) in contrast to the Flanagan case, IUD actions raise
credibility questions.315 These questions require the fact-finder to assess conflicting evidence as to whether the defendant-physician's diagnostic methods and conclusions were consistent with contemporary
professional standards of care.316
The bottom line is that the Court of Appeals continues its long

308. 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
309. See Rodriguez, 77 N.Y.2d at 220-21, 567 N.E.2d at 237, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
See, e.g., Merced v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 56 A.D.2d 553, 391 N.Y.S.2d
863, rev'd, 44 N.Y.2d 398,377 N.E.2d 453,406 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1977) (negligently performed
tubal ligation discovered following emergency surgery for ectopic pregnancy); Matter of
Smalls v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 55 A.D.2d 537,389 N.Y.S.2d 372, rev'd,
44 N.Y.2d 398, 377 N.E.2d 453, 406 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1978) (lesion caused by negligently
performed cervical myelogram); Dobbins v. Cliord, 39 A.D.2d 1, 330 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1972) (damage to pancreas during course of operation to remove spleen); Murphy v. St.
Charles Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 64, 312 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1970) (malfunction in surgically implanted prosthetic device). But see Schiffman v. Hosp. for Joint Diseases, 36 A.D.2d 31,
319 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1971) (declining to apply Flanagan rule to erroneous diagnosis of
malignancy).
310. Rodriguez, 77 N.Y.2d at 221-22,567 N.E.2d at 238,566 N.Y.S.2d at 196 ("Our
continuing commitment to that premise [that Flanagan not be broadened beyond its existing confines] has been reiterated on many occasions, and in several different
contexts.").
311. Id. at 222, 567 N.E.2d at 238, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
312. Id.
313. See Rodriguez, 77 N.Y.2d at 223, 567 N.E.2d at 239, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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tradition of narrowly applying statutes of limitations and deferring to
the legislature to correct any wrongs.317

B. CPLR 214-a: The Continuous Treatment Doctrine
The applicability of the continuous treatment doctrine requires
that there be more than merely a continuing relationship between the
physician and the patient.318 The underlying rationale is the existence
of a "continuing trust and confidence" which warrants the tolling of
the limitations period.319 In this respect, courts restrictively read
CPLR section 214-a.320 Thus continuous treatment contemplates
"scheduled appointments" for "future visits" and not merely a written request by a physician to see his patient seven months after surgery was performed.321 In addition, absent a clear agency
relationship, the doctrine cannot be imputed from one doctor to another.322 Finally, treatment is not considered continuous when the
interval between treatments exceeds the two and one half year limitation period.323
In Jorge v. New York City Health and Hospitals,324 the Appellate
Division for the First Department reinstated a medical malpractice
317. See Goldsmith v. Howrnedica, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 120, 491 N.E.2d 1097, 500
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1986) (holding that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice
action based on a malfunctioning prosthetic device begins to run when the device is installed and not from the time a patient is injured); In re Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 967 (1982); Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780,391 N.E.2d 1002,417
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
318. See Richardson v. Orentreich, 64 N.Y.2d 896, 898,477 N.E.2d 210, 211,487
N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (1985) (citing Coyne v. Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939, 940,463 N.E.2d 371,
372, 474 N.Y.S.2d 970, 971 (1984)).
319. Richardson, 64 N.Y.2d at 898, 477 N.E.2d at 21 1, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
320. See N.Y. CPLR 214-a (McKinney 1990).
321. DePeralta v. Presbyterian Hosp., 121 A.D.2d 346,503 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1st Dep't
1986). But see Ward v. Kaufman, 120 A.D.2d 929, 502 N.Y.S.2d 883 (4th Dep't 1986)
(doctor's telephone call to plaintiff approximately two weeks after he applied a left tibial
cast brace to her leg qualified as continuous treatment).
322. See Modzelewski v. Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center, 120 A.D.2d 498, 501
N.Y.S.2d 699 (2d Dep't 1986); Otero v. Presbyterian Hosp., 116 A.D.2d 511, 497
N.Y.S.2d 381 (1st Dep't 1986).
323. See Sherry v. Queens Kidney Center, 117 A.D.2d 663,664,498 N.Y.S.2d 401,
402 (2d Dep't 1986).
324. 164 A.D.2d 650, 563 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1st Dep't 1990). Plaintiff's suit had been
dismissed in Supreme Court in Manhattan on the ground that the statute of limitations
began running seven months before the youngster's birth, which was on the date when his
father's test for the sickle-cell trait was allegedly misread. The youngster's mother, who
knew she was a camer of the genetic trait for sickle-cell anemia, sought the testing of her
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claim brought on behalf of a five year old male born with sickle-cell
anemia.325 The appellate division held that the one-year-and-90 days
statute of limitations for iiling an action against a municipal defendant
was tolled by the doctrine of continuous treatment until the boy's
birth because his mother had sought and received genetic counselling
regarding a specific condition, and the time limit did not begin to run
until the pregnancy was terminated.326 In a strong dissent, Justice
Wallach stated that the majority had engaged in an inappropriate expansion of the continuous treatment doctrine to reach a sympathetic
result on behalf of the plaintiffs.327

C CPLR 203(b)(5)
Last year's Survey pointed out that the sixty-day extension under
CPLR section 203(b)(5) was applicable in federal diversity cases.J28
We pointed out that courts had yet to resolve the question of whether
delivery to the federal district court clerk also earned the time extension.329 In Datskow v. Teledyne,330 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that service can be made on the federal marshal
instead of the county sheriff and the district court clerk instead of the
county
The circuit court noted that this service does not impair any state interest in establishing limitations on time for the
suit.332 Moreover, the circuit court stated that "the clerk of a district
court may serve as the depository for a summons [under CPLR section203(b)(5)], whether the relevant county is within or without New
husband and when informed that he was negative, she decided to proceed with the pregnancy and gave b i i h to her son. Id
325. When the tests demonstrated that the baby had the disease, plaintiffs alleged
that the father was tested again and found to be a carrier of the sickle-cell trait. Id. at
652, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
326. Id at 652, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
327. Justice Wallach, in his dissent, emphasized that the medical care rendered to
Ms. Jorge was "routine prenatal care, wholly unrelated to sickle-cell anemia" and, therefore, the requirement that there be continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or
condition which gave rise to the alleged malpractice was not satisfied. Id. at 653-54, 563
N.Y.S.2d at 414.
328. See Personis v. Oiler, 889 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1989) (Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that there was nothing in the text of CPLR 203(b)(5) that confines its
effect to state court suits. The circuit court also stated that it had not located any legislative history suggesting such a limitation.)
329. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 104-05.
330. 899 E2d 1298 (2d Cir. 1990).
331. Id. at 1304.
332. Id.
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York City."333 A contrary result would, for example, create two separate rules within the Eastern District of New York, one for cases
within New York City and another for cases outside New York City.
D.

CPLR 214-a: Definition of the Term "Medical Malpractice"

Last year's Survey discussed the Court of Appeals' decision in
Scott v. Ufianov,334 which held that a claim against a hospital for negligent supervision was subject to a two-and-one-half year limitations
period instead of a three-year peri0d.~35During the Survey year, several appellate division opinions have distinguished the Scott holding.336 In Halas v. Parkway Hospital,f37 the Appellate Division for the
Second Department held that a claim that the hospital was negligent
in permitting a patient to remain in a hospital bed which lacked
proper and adequate side rails, and in failing to supervise the patient
properly, sounded in ordinary negligence.338 Thus, the patient was
not barred from stating specific monetary damages in his ad damnum
clauses of the complaint.339 Two months earlier, the Second Department reached a contrary result in Raus v. White Plains Hospital 340 In
Raus, the appellate division believed that the action was based upon
an improper assessment of the plaintx's condition and, therefore,
bore a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment.
As a result, the action was deemed malpractice rather than neglig e n ~ e . ~The
~ l bottom line may depend on how the practitioner pleads

333. Id.
334. 74 N.Y.2d 673, 541 N.E.2d 398, 543 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1989).
335. Plaintiff sustained an injury while in a bed in the emergency room. Almost
three years later, he sued the hospital which claimed that his suit was a medical malpractice claim and, therefore, barred by the two and one-half year period under CPLR 214-a.
The Court of Appeals unanimously held the claim to be one of malpractice and dismissed
it. The Court reasoned that the hospital's supervision and treatment of a patient during
his initial emergency room w e constituted an integral part of the process of rendering
medical treatment to him.
336. See infra notes 337-341 and accompanying text.
337. 158 A.D.2d 516, 551 N.Y.S.2d 279 (2d Dep't 1990).
338. The appellate division stated that "[hlere, the gravamen of the complaint did
not involve diagnosis, treatment or the failure to follow a physician's instruction. .. . The
facts presented in this case establish that the patient's condition was delicate and a risk of
harm was recognized." Halas, 158 A.D.2d at 516, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
339. Id. at 517, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 280 ("Since the nature of the conduct complained
of may readily be assessed based upon common everyday experience of the trier of facts,
the court properly determined that the action sounded in ordinary negligence.").
340. 156 A.D.2d 354, 548 N.Y.S.2d 307 (2d Dep't 1989).
341. Plaintiff received a sedative and about nine hours later fell out of the hospital
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E. CPLR 202: The Borrowing Statute
CPLR 202 applies to actions brought by nonresidents based on
causes of action which occurred outside New York.342 These actions
are subject to the limitation periods of New York and of the state in
which they accrued and, thus, are barred if either period has expired.
Last year's S~rvey34~
discussed the Appellate Division for the First
Department's decision in Besser v. E.R. Squibb & Sons3d4 and promised to report on it this year. The Court of Appeals, without comment, ruled 6-0 to ethe appellate division.345 Thus, it limited the
number of women who can pursue DES related court claims against
pharmaceutical companies under the state's toxic tort law.

F.

Uniform Federal Statute of Limitations for Some Private
Securities Actions

In Ceres Partners v. Gel Associates,346 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit adopted a uniform federal limitations period for
private securities claims under sections lob and 14 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934.347 Thus, claims must be commenced
within one year of discovering the alleged wrongful conduct and
within three years of the conduct's occurrence. The circuit court
noted that century-old precedent required federal courts to borrow
whatever period one state court would conclude a sister state's court
might apply in a case over which neither has any jurisdiction.34* The
court also noted that the practice of looking to state law to determine
the applicable statute of limitations for implied causes of action under
the federal securities laws has been the target of considerable criti-

bed and sustained injuries. The appellate division stated, "[tlhe plaintiff's claim in this
case is premised on an alleged improper assessment of her condition and as such bears a
substantial relationship to the rendition of her medical treatment."
342. See CPLR MANUAL,
supra note 138, at 5 207.
343. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 103.
344. 146 A.D.2d 107,539 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1st Dep't 1990) (holding that the one year
revivor statute in CPLR 214-c did not apply to a claim of a nonresident of New York).
345. See Besser v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 75 N.Y.2d 847, 552 N.E.2d 171, 552
N.Y.S.2d 923 (1990).
346. 918 F.2d at 349.
347. See id.
348. See id. at 352 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985)).
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cisrn.349 The court explained that far from achieving any semblance
of national uniformity, reference to state laws generally results in a
lack of uniformity even within a given circuit.350 The circuit court
also observed that while the U.S. Supreme Court has noted the prevailing practice of borrowing state law for limitations periods for federal securities law claims, it has not explicitly approved the practice,
and its recent discussions of such borrowing for other types of claims
appear to leave open the possibility that the courts should look to a
federal statute instead.351
The circuit court did not address the issue of whether the new
limitation should be applied retroactively. In Finkel v. Stratton,352
however, a federal district court held that it would be "inequitable to
apply Ceres retroactively so as to transform an action, timely when
filed, into one barred forever by the statute of limitations."353 As a
result, the district court held that New York investors had timely filed
their complaint within the six years allowed under the New York
State statute of limitations. Also regarding Welch v. Cadre
which has been argued before the Second Circuit, the court is expected to rule that the new uniform statute of limitations cannot be
applied retroa~tively.35~

VI. RESJUDICATA
Prior Survey articles356 have discussed the substantial develop-

349. Id. at 355 (citing Kronfeld v. Advest, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1449,1457-58 & n. 21
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying a total of 26 separate statutes of limitations)).
350. Id. at 354.
351. Ceres, 918 F.2d at 355 (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs.,
Inc. 483 U.S. 143 (1987). The United States Supreme Court ruled that a uniform statute
of limitations, borrowed from the Clayton Act, should be applied to civil RICO actions.
The Court then explained that among the themes to be distilled from the Supreme
Court's recent borrowing discussions are that selection of a uniform federal limitations
period may be warranted (1) where the statutory claim in question covers a multiplicity
of types of actions, leading to the possible application of a number of different types of
state statutes of limitations; (2) where the federal claim does not precisely match any
state-law claim; (3) where the challenged action is multi-state in nature, perhaps leading
to forum shopping and inordinate litigation expense; and (4) where a federal statute provides a very close analogy. See generally id
352. 754 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
353. Finkel, 754 F. Supp. at 332.
354. 923 F.2d 989 (2d Cu. 1991).
355. See Welch, 923 F.2d at 989.
356. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, I989 Survey, supra note 34, at 112-15; Carlisle, Civil
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ments in the doctrines of claim preclusion357 and issue preclusion358
with respect to civil litigation in New York. During the Survey year,
courts continued to vigorously apply these doctrines to conserve judicial resources and to clear crowded dockets.359 In one case of first
impression, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied issue
preclusion to prevent a party from re-litigating the validity of a state
court sanction and contempt 0rder.~~0
In a contested matrimonial
matter, the Appellate Division for the First Department invoked issue
preclusion to bar one spouse from re-litigating an earlier support order.361 In Milltex Industries v. Jacquard Lace,362 the Second Circuit
reminded the bench and the bar that federal district courts in the Circuit must give res judicata effect to state court judgments.363 Also in

Practice, 1988 Survey, supra note 79, at 120-26; Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1987Survey, supra
note 89, at 107-18; Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1986 Survey, supra note 225, at 141-48.
357. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits bars a
subsequent action between the parties, or persons in privity with them, from relitigating
the same cause of action. It bars the relitigation of claims which might have been litigated, as well as those which actually were litigated. See O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54
N.Y.2d 353,429 N.E.2d 1158,445 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1981); Smith v. Russell Sage College,
54 N.Y.2d 185,429 N.E.2d 746,445 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1981).
358. As the doctrine of issue preclusion now stands, a valid final judgment on the
merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction prevents relitigation by the parties or
their privies of matters of fact or law actually litigated or necessarily determined in the
earlier action. Two prerequisites must be met to apply the doctrine in New York courts.
"First, the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be
decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded . . must have had a
full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination." Kaufman v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449,453,482 N.E.2d 63, 66,492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (1985).
359. See Zapata v. Town of Huntington, 203 N.Y.L.J. 106 (Sup. Ct., Suff. Co. 1990)
(dismissal of federal civil rights claim bars state tort suit on same facts); Caruso & Sons
Elec. Contracting, Inc. v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Bldgs., N.Y.L.J., Sept 6, 1990, at 21, col.
6; Gangitano v. TCI Constr. Corp., N.Y.L.J., Sept. 6, 1990, at 18, col. 2 (set-off to Pennsylvania mechanic's lien bars New York breach-of-contract suit); Glass v. Glass,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 30, 1990, at 30, col. 2 (issue of title to marital residence is barred by claim
preclusion); Marcic v. Verkooyen, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12, 1990, at 32, col. 6 (agency determination precludes relitigation of same issue in court). See also Dachs & Dachs, Collateral
Estoppel and Res Judicata in Arbitration, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 13, 1990, at 3, col. 4; Barker,
New York Practice: Collateral Estoppel, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 1990, at 3, col. 1. See generally, Silver, In Lieu of Preclusion: Reconciling Adminktrative Decision-making and Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. L.J. 367 (1990).
360. Polur v. R a e , 912 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1990).
361. Labow v. Labow, 154 A.D.2d 90, 550 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1st Dep't 1990).
362. 922 F.2d 164 (2d Cu. 1991).
363. An Alabama state court rendered a decision several days before the district
court in New York; the Second Cucuit held that the Alabama judgment must be given
claim preclusion effect. Id

.
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Lytle v. Household Manufacturing,364 the United States Supreme
Court refused to give issue preclusion effect to a district court's determination of issues common to equitable and legal claims under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act365 and 42 U.S.C. section 1981.366
The Court held that the prior holding in Parklane Hosiery v. Shore,367
that a court's determination of issues in an equitable action could collaterally estop re-litigation of the same issues in a subsequent legal
action without violating a litigant's right to a jury trial, could not be
extended to the Lytle actions.368 These decisions demonstrate that the
practitioner must be alert to the adverse consequences of the
doctrine.369
The most important res judicata developments during the Survey
year relate to the recent expansion of the scope of issue preclusion by
applying the doctrine to prior criminal issue determinations in order
to preclude subsequent civil litigation.370 This is particularly true
with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.371 The Court of
Appeals decision in D'Arata v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance372and two opinions by the Appellate Division for the Second
Department373 will be analyzed.

A. Background
In the case of S T. Grand v. City of New York,374 the Court of
Appeals first applied the doctrine of issue preclusion to a criminal
-- -

364. 110 S. Ct. 1331 (1990).
365. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e
(1982).
366. See 42 U.S.C. 8 1981 (1988).
367. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
368. In Parklane, the Supreme Court held that a prior resolution of issues collaterally estopped relitigation of the same issues in a second, separate action, even though the
plaintif was entitled to a jury trial in the second action. The Court refused to extend the
Parklane doctrine because the Lytle case involved only one suit in which the plaintiff
properly joined his legal and equitable claims.
L. REV.
369. See generally Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple, 55 FORDHAM
63 (1986).
370. See Carlisle, Issue Preclusion Eflect of Criminal Convictions in Subsequent Civil
Litigation, 17 WESTCHESTERB.J. 207 (1990); see also infra notes 370-417.
371. See M i l e , Issue Preclusion, supra note 370, at 212-13.
372. 76 N.Y.2d 659, 564 N.E.2d 634, 563 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1990).
373. See Sullivan v. Breese, 160 A.D.2d 997, 554 N.Y.S.2d 937 (2d Dep't 1990);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Zuk, 160 A.D.2d 971, 554 N.Y.S.2d 939 (2d Dep't 1990).
374. 32 N.Y.2d 300, 298 N.E.2d 105, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1973).
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conviction in order to preclude subsequent civil litigation.375 S.T.
Grand, Inc. was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to use interstate facilities with intent to violate the New York State bribery laws.
The conviction stemmed from illegal activity on the part of S.T.
Grand concerning a contract with New York City for the cleaning of
a reservoir. Following the conviction, S.T. Grand sued the city for
the unpaid balance due on the contract. The city fled a counterclaim
for monies previously paid on the contract. Although the contract
had been performed by S.T. Grand, the city moved for a summary
judgment on the grounds of issue preclusion. It argued that S.T.
Grand's criminal conviction was proof that the contract was illegal
and there was no triable issue of fact. Special Term denied the summary judgment motion, but the Appellate Division reversed and directed a verdict for the defendant.376 Plaintiff appealed, and the
Court of Appeals found that the doctrine of issue preclusion was applicable because issues necessarily decided in the criminal action were
decisive to the civil action.377
In Gilberg v. Barbieri,378 the Court of Appeals qualified its holding in S.T Grand. A divided court held that an harassment conviction for assault would not preclude re-litigation of the identical issue
in a civil lawsuit because the defendant demonstrated that the full and
fair opportunity requirement had not been satisfied.379 The Gilberg
court held that the defendant could not foresee that his conviction on

375. See ST Grand, 32 N.Y.2d at 300, 298 N.E.2d at 105, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 304, 298 N.E.2d at 107, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
378. 53 N.Y.2d 285,423 N.E.2d 807,441 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1981).
379. See Gilberg, 53 N.Y.2d at 294, 423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The
Court of Appeals framed the issue as "whether a conviction for the petty offense of harassment can later be used to preclude the defendant from disputing the merits of a civil
suit for assault, involving the same incident and seeking a quarter of a million dollars."
Id. at 288,423 N.E.2d at 807,441 N.Y.S.2d at 49. A divided Court of Appeals refused to
give conclusive effect to the prior determination beyond the proceeding in which it was
made. See id. at 292, 423 N.E.2d at 809, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 51. The majority found that
the defendant was afforded neither an opportunity nor an incentive to litigate the harassment conviction thoroughly or as he might have if more were at stake. Id. at 293, 423
N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The Court of Appeals noted that a contrary ruling
would encourage civil litigants to file criminal complaints which would frustrate the very
purpose of res judicata. Id. at 294, 423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The Court
also observed that future parties would be compelled to defend minor criminal charges
with a vigor out of proportion to the charge and at variance with the proper function of
the local criminal courts. Gilberg, 53 N.Y.2d at 294,423 N.E.2d at 810,441 N.Y.S.2d at
52.
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a violation would later be used to establish conclusive liability in a
$250,000 personal injury suit. Therefore, he was not accorded a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.3S0 The Court of Appeals
also emphasized the brisk and informal manner of the prior hearing
and observed that the defendant had neither the opportunity nor the
incentive to litigate as thoroughly as he might have if the stakes had
been greater.381 In later cases, New York courts began to apply the
doctrine of issue preclusion to criminal convictions based on guilty
pleas.382 Courts held that a plea may preclude subsequent re-litigation in a civil action of issues necessarily decided and actually litigated
in prior criminal proceedings.

B.

D'Arata, Zuk, and Sullivan

In D'Arata,383the plaintiff, a shooting victim, sought to recover
from the insurer of the assailant the amount of a default judgment
obtained against the insured.384 The insured had been convicted after

380. Id.
381. Id. at 293,423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at
330 (it may be unfair to permit offensive use of collateral estoppel if defendant in first
action was sued for nominal or small damages and subsequent lawsuit is unforeseeable
because he may not have incentive to "defend vigorously").
382. See Abraho v. Perrault, 147 A.D.2d 824, 537 N.Y.S.2d 913 (3d Dep't 1989)
(defendant pled guilty to two counts of vehicular manslaughter as a result of an auto
accident; In a subsequent civil action, the court held that defendant's guilty plea precluded him from relitigating the issue of his negligence concerning the accident);
Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arzillo, 98 A.D.2d 495, 472 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't 1984)
(appellate division recognized that there was no actual "litigation" involved in regard to
the defendant's guilty plea, but still found that "the issues have necessarily been judicially
determined by the plea so that the criminal defendant is estopped to contest them in
subsequent civil litigation"). See also Gerney v. Tishman Constr. Corp., 136 Misc. 2d
105, 518 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1987) (crane operator pled guilty to second
degree criminal assault, and in subsequent civil suit for personal injuries, plaintiff's summary judgment motion was granted on the grounds that the identity of issue and fidl and
fair opportunity requirements had been satisfied); McMillan v. Williams, 116 Misc. 2d
171,455 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1982). In McMillan, the defendant had been
convicted of assault after entering a plea of guilty. In a subsequent civil suit, Special
Term gave the guilty plea the same preclusive effect against the defendant as it would
after a full trial. Id See generally, Thau, Collateral Estoppel and the Reliability of Criminal Determinations: Theoretical, Practical and Strategic Complicationsfor Criminal and
Civil Litigation, 70 GEO. L.J. 1079 (1982).
383. 76 N.Y.2d 659, 564 N.E.2d 634, 563 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1990).
384. D'Arata, 76 N.Y.2d at 662, 564 N.E.2d at 635, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 25. Plaintiff
Robert D'Arata was the party who was shot. The Court of Appeals referred to the
claims of plaintiff Daren D'Arata, Robert's wife, as derivative. Thus the plaintiffs were,
when necessary, collectively referred to as plaintiff. Id.
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a jury trial of first degree assault arising out of the in~ident.3~~
The
insurance policy expressly excluded recovery for bodily injury "expected or intended by the Insured."386 Thus, the issue before the
Court was whether the insurer could use the insured's criminal judgment of conviction as a collateral bar to plaintiff's attempt in a civil
case to re-litigate the issue of his assailant's intent to injure.387 The
Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division and held that the
plaintiff should be collaterally estopped and that the action, therefore,
was properly dismissed.388
The initial question for the Court to determine was whether
plaintiff, a nonparty to the prior criminal proceeding, should be
bound by the adverse determination on intent in that proceeding.
This required a finding that the plaintiff was in privity with his assailant. The Court pointed to Insurance Law section 3420(b)(1)389which
permitted plaintiff to maintain a direct action against the insurer on
the plicy.390 The Court explained that plaintiff was standing in the
shoes of the insured and could have no greater rights than the insured. Thus, the inevitable consequence of plaintiff's election to proceed against defendant under the Insurance Law was that he was in
legal privity with the claimed insured for the purpose of an issue preclusion analysis.39

385. Id. (plaintiff, the complaining witness, test%& for the prosecution in the criminal case).
386. Id.
387. N.Y. PENALLAW§ 120.10 (1) (McKinney 1987) states that a person is guilty
of assault in the first degree when "[wlith intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument."
388. See infra notes 392-401.
389. See N.Y. INS. LAW 5 3420 (McKinney Supp. 1990) which provides:
@) . . . an action may be maintained by the following persons against the insurer upon any policy or contract of liabiity insurance . . to recover the
amount of a judgment against the insured. . . (1) any person. . . has obtained a
judgment against the insured . . . for damages for injury sustained or loss or
damage occasioned during the life of the policy or contract . . . .
390. D'Arata, 76 N.Y.2d 659,564 N.E.2d 634,563 N.Y.S.2d 24. The Court of Appeals observed that "plaintiff 'stands in the shoes' of the insured and can have no greater
rights than the insured . . . [and] by proceeding directly against defendant, does so as
subrogee of the insured's rights and is subject to whatever rules of estoppel would apply
to the insured." Id. at 665, 564 N.E.2d at 637, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
391. Id. ('("Generally a nonparty to a prior litigation may be collaterally estopped by
a determination in that litigation by having a relationship with a party to the prior litigation such that his own rights or obligations in the subsequent proceeding are conditioned
in one way or another on, or derivative of, the rights of the party to the prior litigation!').

.
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The next question for the Court of Appeals to determine was
whether the two basic requirements for invoking the doctrine of issue
preclusion had been satisfied.392The Court easily concluded that the
"full and fair opportunity" requirement was satisfied because the insured had a jury trial which resulted in a verdict in which all of the
elements of the crime, including intent, were necessarily proven
against him.393 The Court then addressed the more difficult question
of whether the defendant had proven the requisite identity of the issue
between the civil case and the prior criminal proceeding.3g4 The
Court explained that it must be shown by the moving party that the
identical issue was necessarily decided in the first proceeding and is
conclusive in the subsequent action.395 In addition, the court stated
that it must be shown that the issue was "actually litigated" in the
first proceeding.396 Plaintiff argued that the issue of the insured's intent was never contested in the first proceeding because the defenses
at the trial were mistaken identification and alibi.397 Furthermore, the
insured had "simply defaulted as to that portion of the indictment
that alleged the action was intentional."398 The Court rejected this
argument on the grounds that the jury had to be satisfied that the
prosecution had met its burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable
doubt or else there would not have been a guilty verdict.399 The plaintiff also argued that issue preclusion should not be applied "based on
general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation."m The Court rejected this argument on the policy ground of minimiziig inconsistent judgments.401

392. Id. ("We turn to the question of whether the two basic requirements for invoking collateral estoppel have been satisfied: (1) that the identical issue was necessarily
decided in the prior proceeding and is decisive of the present action, and (2) that there
was a full and fair opportunity to contest that issue in the prior proceeding.").
393. See D'Arata, 76 N.Y.2d 659, 564 N.E.2d 634, 563 N.Y.S.2d 24.
394. See id.
395. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF JUDGMENTS,
g 27, comment c).
396. Id. Generally for "a question to have been actually litigated so as to satisfy the
identity requirement it must have been properly raised by the pleadings or otherwise
placed in issue and actually determined in the prior proceeding." Halyalkar v. Board of
Regents, 72 N.Y.2d 261, 268, 527 N.E.2d 1222, 1226, 532 N.Y.S.2d 85, 89 (1988); see
also WATEMENT
(SECOND)OF JUDGMENTS,27, comments d & e.
397. D'Arata, 76 N.Y.2d at 667, 564 N.E.2d at 639, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. Indeed, it would be anomalous to permit plaints now to relitigate an issue
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In Sullivan v. Breese'402 the Appellate Division for the Second
Department directly addressed the issue of whether issue preclusion
effect should be given to a defendant's guilty plea in a subsequent civil
suit.403 The appellate division focused on whether re-litigation
should be permitted in light of competing policy considerations.~
These include fairness to the parties, conservation of the resources of
the court and the litigants, and societal interests in consistent and accurate results.405 The appellate division emphasized that these factors
may vary in relative importance depending on the nature of the proceedings.406 In Sullivan, the Second Department refused to apply issue preclusion because the stakes were so trivial that the defendant
had no motivation to fully and vigorously litigate his criminal
conviction.407
In Allstate Insurance v. Zuk,408 the defendant pled guilty to second degree manslaughter for the death of Michael Smith. Subsequently, decedent's spouse brought a wrongful death action against
defendant, who was insured by Allstate.409 Allstate commenced an
action for a declaratory judgment that it was not obliged to indemnify
defendant because its policy coverage excluded any injuries resulting
from the intentional acts of the insured party.410 The appellate division held that defendant's guilty plea had conclusively established the
issue of defendant's intent.411 They applied the doctrine of issue preclusion and granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.412 The
Zuk decision is, arguably, distinguishable from Sullivan because of
the seriousness of the second degree manslaughter charges that
prompted Zuk to enter a guilty plea.
The Court of Appeals has granted leave to appeal in Zuk413and
we will report its decision in next year's Survey. The Court will have

which the jury has already determined under a higher standard of proof in the criminal
case in which plaintiff, himself, gave evidence supporting the jury's finding.
402. 160 A.D.2d 997, 554 N.Y.S.2d 937 (2d Dep't 1990).
403. Id at 997-98, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 937-38.
404. Id. at 998, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 999, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
408. 160 A.D.2d 971, 972, 554 N.Y.S.2d 939, 940 (2d Dep't 1990).
409. Id.
410. Id
41 1. Id at 972-73, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
412. Id. at 973, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
413. 76 N.Y.2d 711, 565 N.E.2d 516, 563 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1990).

Heinonline - - 42 Syracuse L. Rev. 392 1991

19911

Civil Practice

393

to determine the diflicult question of whether the identity of issue requirement was met. In DYrata the jury had to find intent to convict
the defendant.414 In Zuk there is the question of whether a guilty plea
to manslaughter in the second degree involves intent.415 To establish
identity of issue, the party moving for invocation of issue preclusion
must establish that Zuk did more than act recklessly when the underlying incident occurred.416 The Court of Appeals must also face the
policy issue of whether a future defendant will be reluctant to enter a
guilty plea if he anticipates it will be used against him in a subsequent
civil proceeding. It seems unlikely that Michael Milken would have
pled guilty in federal court to six counts of conspiracy and fraud if he
knew issue determinations necessary to his plea could later be used to
conclusively establish liability against him in New York State civil
litigation.417

VII.

SANCTIONCASES,
MANDATORY
CONTINUING
LEGAL
EDUCATION,
AND COMPULSORY
PROBONO

A. Sanction Decisions
Last year's Survey discussed many of the recent sanction decisions which New York State trial courts issued pursuant to the new

414. See D'Amta, 76 N.Y.2d 659, 564 N.E.2d 634, 563 N.Y.S.2d 24. Here, of
course, in the criminal proceeding the People bore the burden of proving the defendant's
intent to injure plaintiff (see N.Y. PENALLAW 5 120.10[1]). The issue of intent was
necessarily submitted to the jury in the court's charge as a factual question on an essential
element of the crime. Id. at 664, 564 N.E.2d at 637, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
415. Zuk pleaded guilty to second degree manslaughter, which is an unintentional
crime. See N.Y. PENALLAW5 125 (McKinney 1990).
416. See Zuk, 160 A.D.2d at 972,554 N.Y.S.2d at 940, where the appellate division
held: "When Zuk pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the second degree in the criminal
prosecution arising out of this incident, it was necessarily determined that the decedent's
death was caused by Zuk's 'criminal act.' " Allstate submitted no proof that the result in
this case was ever expected by the insured. Thus arguably the case falls within the "accident" rule of the decided cases. See Miller v. Continental Ins. Co., 40 N.Y.2d 675, 358
N.E.2d 258, 389 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1976) (accidental death from intentional dose of heroin);
Wellisch v. John Hancock Mutual L i e Ins. Co., 64 Misc. 2d 791, 316 N.Y.S.2d 722
(1970) (same); Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 140, 7 N.E.2d 18 (1937)
(same); Adlerblum v. Metropolitan L i e Ins. Co., 284 N.Y. 695, 30 N.E.2d 728 (1940)
(accidental death from reaction to novacaine intentionally administered for tonsilitis);
Gallagher v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 163 A.D. 556, 148 N.Y.S. 1016 (2d Dep't 1914),
a r d , 221 N.Y. 664, 117 N.E. 1067 (1917) (accidental death from sunstroke while attempting to tan).
417. See Adams, Defense Lawyers Surprised at Milken Sentence, 204 N.Y.L.J. 100
(1990).
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rules for frivolous litigation that became effective January 1, 1989.4'*
During this Survey year, the Court of Appeals imposed sanctions for
the first time under the new rule~.~19
Several appellate divisions also
issued sanction opinions,420 and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
sanctions could be awarded against a plaintiff who had voluntarily
dismissed his complaint.421
In Minister, Elders and Deacons of the Reformed Protestant
Church of the City of New York v. 198 Broadway Inc. ,422 the Court of
Appeals, in a per curiam decision, imposed a $2,500 sanction on an
overly persistent litigant at the request of his adversary.423 This was
the first time the Court of Appeals applied Part 130 of the Uniform
Rules for the New York State Trial Courts.424 The respondent had
made a series of motions425 which the Court found to be "utterly
~ 6 made for the sole purpose of delaying
without legal s ~ p p o r t " ~and

418. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 71-78.
419. See Ministers, Elders, & Deacons of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church of
the City of N.Y. v. 198 Broadway, Inc., 76 N.Y.2d 411, 559 N.E.2d 429, 559 N.Y.S.2d
886 (1990); John B. Bell v. New York Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 930,
564 N.E.2d 664, 563 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1990); Maroulis v. 64th St. - Third Ave. Assoc., 77
N.Y.2d 831, 567 N.E.2d 978, 566 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1991).
420. See Hoeflich v. Chemical Bank, 149 A.D.2d 341,539 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't
1989); see aZso Strout Realty Inc. v. Mechta, - A.D.2d -, 565 N.Y.S.2d 749 (2d Dep't
1991) (appeal so obviously lacking in merit that it was characterized as frivolous and
Mechta was ordered to pay $3,949 in costs and sanctions); Grasso v. Matthew, 164
A.D.2d 476, 564 N.Y.S.2d 576 (3d Dep't 1991) (imposing court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees against attorney pursuant to CPLR 8303-a).
421. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
422. 76 N.Y.2d 41 1, 559 N.E.2d 429, 559 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1990).
423. Ministers, Elders, & Deacons, 76 N.Y.2d at 411, 559 N.E.2d at 429, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 886. The respondent, Modell, sought to renew its sublease but was denied
right to do so because of the master tenant's decision not to renew the lease. The Appellate Division for the First Department awarded petitioner possession of the premises in
1982, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division order in 1983. The respondent then sought a declaratory judgment action based on a new legal theory, and
filed an unsuccessll appeal to the Court of Appeals from an appellate division order
dismissing that action. Thereafter respondent filed various other post-appeal motions
with the Court of Appeals and two separate motions at the trial court to vacate the
dispossess judgment upheld by the Court of Appeals. Finally respondent moved for an
order recalling and amending the remittitur of the 1983 decision. The Court of Appelas,
in imposing sanctions, dismissed Modell's motion as "plainly untimely," and noted that
the time for making such motions had expired almost seven years before. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 413, 559 N.E.2d at 430, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
426. Id.
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enforcement of an earlier j~dgment.~27The Court of Appeals imposed sanctions for the second time in John B. Bell v. The New York
Higher Education Assistance428 The Court granted respondent's motion for sanctions on the ground that appellant had filed a chain of
motions which constituted a dilatory and frivolous avoidance of a 20year old student loan debt.429 The Court also found that appellant
had failed to pay motion costs previously imposed by the Court of
Appeals, and therefore imposed sanctions in the amount of $1,000.430
In both Bell and Minister, sanctions were imposed for misconduct occurring in both the lower courts and the Court of Appeals. The Court
has yet to award sanctions simply for frivolous conduct in the courts
below, nor has the Court imposed a $2500 sanction on an attorney for
frivolous litigation practi~es.43~
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartrnar~43~
the U.S. Supreme Court was
faced with three issues relating to the application of Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: first, whether a district court may
impose Rule 11 sanctions on a plaintiff who has voluntarily dismissed
his complaint pursuant to Rule 41(a)(l)(i);433second, what constitutes
the appropriate standard of appellate review of a district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions;434 and third, whether Rule 11 sanctions
authorize awards of attorney fees incurred on appeal of a Rule 11
sanction.435 The Supreme Court held that a voluntary Rule 41 dismissal did not deprive a district court of jurisdiction over a Rule 11
motion.436 The Court also held that federal appellate courts should
apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a
--

-

-

-

427. Ministers, Elders & Deacons, 76 N.Y.2d at 413, 559 N.E.2d at 430, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 867.
428. 76 N.Y.2d 930, 564 N.E.2d 664, 563 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1990).
429. The Court of Appeals dismissed a motion for leave to appeal on the grounds
that the orders appellant sought to appeal from were not final. The Court also granted
respondent's motion for sanctions and noted that appellant had filed five motions "in a
chain reflecting a strategy of dilatory, frivolous avoidance of a 20 year old student loan
debt for two years' law school education." Bell, 76 N.Y.2d at 930, 565 N.E.2d at 664,
563 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
430. Id
431. See Mamulis, 77 N.Y.2d 831, 567 N.E.2d 978, 556 N.Y.S.2d 584.
432. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
433. Cooter & Gell, 110 S.Ct. at2449.
434. Id. at 2450.
435. Id. at 2451.
436. Id at 2449. This view is consistent with Rule ll's purposes of deterring baseless filings and streamlining federal court procedure and is not contradicted by anything
in that rule or Rule 41(a)(l)(i).
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district court's decision in a Rule 11 proceeding.437 Finally, the
Supreme Court held that Rule 11 does not authorize a district court
to award attorney's fees incurred on appeal.438 The Cooter decision
was followed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Mareno v. Rowe.439 The district court had imposed Rule 11 sanctions
on Mareno for frivolously asserting jurisdiction over the defendant
pursuant to the New York long arm statute.440 The Circuit Court,
with a strong dissenting opinion, found that the positions advanced by
Mareno and his attorney were not so untenable as a matter of law as
to necessitate sanction.41 The Court held that the award of a $4,800
sanction was inappropriate and failed to recognize the complexities of
New York's long arm jurisprudence.42
Three appellate divisions issued instructive sanction opinions. In
Hoeflich v. Chemical Bank43 the First Department imposed a sanction of $500 on the executor of an estate who had brought a frivolous
motion to vacate an earlier order of the court.444 In Mechta v.
Mack45 the Second Department imposed a $1,000 sanction on apm
se plaintiff's attorney for his conduct in pursuing frivolous appeals

437. Id Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals should have applied a threetiered standard of review. This included a clearly erroneous standard for findings of historical fact, a de novo standard for the determination that counsel violated Rule 11, and
an abuse of discretion standard for the choice of sanction. The Supreme Court rejected
the petitioner's approach primarily on the ground that the Court of Appeals must defer
to the district court's legal conclusions in Rule 11 proceedings.
438. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2449. The Supreme Court held that neither the
language of Rule 11's sanctions provisions, when read in connection with Rule 1's statement that the Rules only govern district court procedure, nor the Advisory Committee
Note suggests that Rule 11 could require payment for appellate proceedings.
439. 910 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1990).
440. Mareno, 910 E2d at 1044. (Mareno argued that the defendants were amenable
to suit under New York's corporate presence doctrine and under its long arm statute).
See N.Y. CPLR 301, 302(a)(3).
441. 910 E2d 1047. "There is no doubt that the arguments presented by Mareno
were not persuasive. Nevertheless, to constitute a frivolous legal position for purposes of
Rule 11 sanction, it must be clear under existing precedents that there is no chance of
success and no reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands."
Id (citations omitted).
442. Id. at 1047. The positions advanced by Mareno and his attorney, however
faulty, were not so untenable as a matter of law as to necessitate sanction. Nor did they
constitute the type of abuse of the adversary system that Rule 11 was designed to guard
against. Id. at 1047.
443. 149 A.D.2d 341, 539 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't 1989).
444. Hoejlich, 149 A.D.2d at 341, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
445. 149 A.D.2d 747, 549 N.Y.S.2d 508 (2d Dep't 1989).
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from two orders of the Supreme Court.446 Mechta claimed at oral
argument to have researched the issues relevant to the subject appeal
and expended a total of two and a half days in preparing the appellate
brief.447 The Second Department held that even a cursory review of
law in the area of defamation would have revealed that Mechta's action was totally devoid of legal merit.448 The appellate division also
found that Mechta's "conduct not only constituted a misuse of and a
burden on judicial resources, but also placed a substantial burden on
the defendants in time and costs associated with a defense of the appeal."449 In Grasso v. Mathew,4" the Third Department imposed
sanctions under CPLR 8303-a against a Schenectady lawyer who filed
a libel suit against the husband of his client in a divorce action.4"
The appellate division held that the husband's comments enjoyed an
absolute privilege, and that the lawyer's defamation action was
frivol0us.45~
On an issue of first impression in New York, a federal district
court ordered an attorney to submit to remedial legal education in
lieu of monetary sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.453 The district court, through a magistrate, found that plaintiffs' counsel had little litigation experience and that attorney
The magistrate
ineptitude is not cured by high monetary ~enalties.~54
concluded that the deterrent function of Rule 11 would be better
served by a sanction tailored to improving the lawyers skills as a practicing attorney so that he would not make similar mistakes in the fuThe magistrate directed plaintiffs' counsel to attend a two day
course in federal practice and procedure offered by one of the bar
associations, or a one semester course in the same area at an accredited law schoo1.456
Finally, the New York State Bar Association has recommended

446. Mechta, 149 A.D.2d at 747, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. 164 A.D.2d 476, 564 N.Y.S.2d 576 (3d Dep't 1991).
45 1. Grasso, 164 A.D.2d at 477, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
452. Id. at 479-80, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 578-79.
453. See Versailles Realty Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 1190 W L
176727 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
454. Id.
455. Id
456. Id
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that there be significant amendments made to Part 130 of the Rules of
the Chief Administrative Judge, which authorizes a fine of as much as
$10,000 for frivolous behavior.457 A special committee, chaired by
former Court of Appeals Judge Hugh R. Jones, submitted a report on
March 20, 1990 which warns that the current rule may unnecessarily
chill access to the New York State courts without preventing the conduct that actually causes needless expense and delay.458 The Jones
Committee also recommended that the rule's focus be changed from a
ban on "frivolous" conduct to "abusive" conduct.459 The State Legislature continues to oppose the new sanction rule.-

B. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Last year's Survey discussed the arguments for and against
mandatory continuing legal education ("CLE").461 During the Survey year the House of Delegates of the New York State Bar Association adopted a resolution favoring the general concept of mandatory
CLE.462 Later, the House considered specific provisions of the proposed rule and suggested amendment^.^^ After adopting certain
amendments, the House endorsed a proposed rule.* The State Association is now proposing this rule for promulgation by the appropriate
authority.465 The rule provides for the appointment of a continuing
legal education commission,466and requires every active attorney admitted and practicing in the state to complete eighteen hours of continuing legal education biennially, at least two hours of which shall

457. See New York State Bar Association, REPORTOF SPECIALCOMMITTEE
TO
CONSIDERSANCTIONS
FORFRIVOLOUS
LITIGATION IN NEW YORKSTATECOURTS,
March 20, 1990 [hereinafter BAR ASSOC. REPORT](copy on file with the Syracuse Law
Review).
458. Id. at 5-6.
459. Id.
460. Id. See also Spencer, State Bar Seeks to Cut Finesjbm Lawyer Sanction Rules,
N.Y.L.J., April 12, 1990, p.1, col. 3.
461. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, I989 Survey, supra note 34, at 78-82.
462. See Spencer, Mandatory CLE Wins Approval of State Bar, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22,
1990, p.1, col. 5.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. See generally Wise, Lawyers Education: A Legklative Isrue, 203 N.Y.L.J. 51
(1990); Ostertag, In Defense of MCLE, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 16, 1990, at 1, col. 3; McKay,
MCLE: Try It, You May Like It, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 1990, at 2, col. 6.
466. See New York State Bar Association, D R A F ~4: Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education For Attorneys (AS ADOPTED AT THE JUNE22, 1990 HOUSEOF DELEGATES
LAWREVIEW).
MEETING)(COPYON FILE WITH THE SYRACUSE
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consist of education relating to professional responsibility and legal
ethi~s.4~7
All attorneys subject to the rule must, at the time of their
biennial registration, report their participation in CLE activities during the preceding twenty-four months.&* If an attorney fails to comply with the Rule, the CLE Commission will send a notice of
delinquency to the attorney.469 Within ninety days following receipt
of the notice, the attorney must cure the delinquency or the matter
will be referred to the appropriate appellate division of the supreme
court for disciplinary action.470 It is expected that the chief judge will
implement the rule through the Judiciary Law so that noncompliance
will constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
and, thus, be subject to enforcement.
It should be noted that one-half of the proposed eighteen hour
CLE requirement can be satisfied by videotape or in house CLE
presentations. It is anticipated that the Chief Judge of the State of
New York will implement the CLE rule in 1992 or 1993.

C CompuIsory Pro Bono
Last year's Survey discussed the merits of mandatory pro bono
("MPB)471 which has divided the bench and bar.472 Chief Judge
Wachtler appointed an advisory panel which proposed that all of New
York's lawyers donate at least twenty hours of free legal time a year
to pro bono proje~ts.473 After the proposal was submitted to Chief
Judge Wachtler in early 1990, he gave the state and local bar associations two years to show whether a voluntary pro bono program could
meet the legal needs of the poor.474 The Chief Judge has also appointed a Pro Bono Review Committee to monitor how well the pro-

467. Id. at 4-5.
468. Id. at 5-6.
469. Id
470. Id. at 6-7.
471. See Carliile, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 82-84.
472. Id.
473. Id. See also New York State Bar Association, REPORTOF THESPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO REVIEWTHE PROPOSED
PLANFOR MANDATORY PROBONOSERVICE,
OCtober 16, 1989.
474. Adarns, WachtlerDefers Mandatoly Pro Bono, N.Y.L.J., May 2, 1990,at 1, col.
3. Chief Judge Wachtler gave the New York bar a two-year deadline to demonstrate that
voluntary services could be sufficiently increased. If pro bono service "does not meet the
desperate need [for legal services], I will propose . . . a rule be promulgated mandating
pro bono services for the poor as recommended by the Marrero Committee." Id.
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gram works.475 The Committee plans to do some kind of objective
~urvey.4~~
The New York State Bar Association has proposed that
the State Office of Court Administration require attorneys to report
on their pro bono work as part of their biennial registration.477The
New York County Lawyers Association and five other county bar
groups have opposed any plan to survey lawyers or to require them to
file reports regarding their pro bono contribution^.^^^

VIII. DISCLOSURE
There were several major disclosure decisions during the Survey
~ear.~79
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously that universities
and colleges charged with discrimination in tenure determinations
must make relevant personnel files available to Federal investigat o r ~ The
. ~ ~
New
~ York Court of Appeals defined the parameters of
discovery against corporations481and one appellate division issued
important opinions regarding discovery access to surveillance photographs482 and internal investigation for corporate clients.483 A state
trial court held that the medical records of family members of DES
plaintiffs are discoverable484 and another trial court ruled that a plaintiff may depose itself.485These and other decisions will be analyzed.
In University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity
475. Spencer, Chief Judge Names Panel To Monitor Pm Bono Effort, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
11, 1990, at 1, col. 3. Panelists to monitor the voluntary pro bono program are: Victor
Marrero, Esq.; Justin Vigdor, Esq.; Joseph S. Genova, Esq.; and Robert Ostertag, Esq.
The Committee will endeavor to determine how much time attorneys in New York
devote to providing free civil legal services.
476. See Vol. 32, No. 5 State Bar News, WachtlerEndorses Voluntary Pm Bono For
2 Years; Will Decide Then About Mandatory, at 1, col. 3 (May 1990).
477. Spencer, Pro Bono Reporting by Individuals Opposed, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 26, 1990,
at 1, col. 3. See generally, Dean, Voluntaly or Mandatory Service, N.Y.L.J., May 21,
1990, at 3, col. 1.
478. Id.
479. See infra notes 480-51 1 and accompanying text.
480. University of Pa. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 577
(1990).
481. See Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 558 N.Y.S.2d 493
(1990).
482. Marte v. W.O. Hickok Mfg. Co., 154 A.D.2d 173, 552 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1st Dep't
1990).
483. Spectrum Systems Int'l Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 157 A.D.2d 444, 558
N.Y.S.2d 486 (1st Dep't 1990).
484. Blank v. Eli Lilly & Co., N.Y.L.J., Aug. 31, 1990, at 1, col.
485. Sigman-Weiss Consultants Inc. v. RaS, 149 Misc.2d 111, 563 N.Y.S.2d 618
(Civ. Ct., Kings Co. 1990).

-.
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Commission486an educator fded a discrimination complaint against a
university with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.487
The U.S.Supreme Court held that there was not a common law privilege against the disclosure of confidential peer review documents and
that there was no first amendment right of "academic freedom"
against the disclosure of the contested doc~ments.48~
Last year's Survey criticized the appellate division's decision in
Niesig v. Team I.489 We pointed out that the Second Department's
presumption that all current employees are agents of a corporation
contradicts the Court of Appeals' view as to the attorney-client relationship.490 We also suggested that the Niesig opinion was contrary to
the Court of Appeals' decision in Rossi v. BIue Cross & BIue Shield491
and that it failed to provide adequate guidelines for corporate counsel
who face serious conflict of interest problems. During the Survey year
the Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division decision which
had barred all ex parte communication with corporate employees.492
The Court noted that the appellate division's ruling, which prohibited
lawyers from interviewing a party without consent of the party's attorney, had the advantage of being clear but that it closed off avenues
of informal discovery of information that may serve both the litigants
and the entire justice system.493 The Court of Appeals, speaking
through Judge Kaye, adopted an "alter ego" test which defines a
party to include only corporate employees whose acts or omissions
are binding on the corporation or imputed to the corporation for purposes of its liability, or to employees who are deemed to be implementing the advice of counsel.494 The Court held that all other
employees may be interviewed informally.495 Judge Bellacosa concurred and pointed out that the "alter ego" definition will function
almost identically with the rejected "blanket preclusion" definition
used by the appellate division.496 Judge Bellacosa suggested that par486.
487.
488.
489.
Neki~).
490.
491.
492,
493.
494.
495.
496.

110 s . Ct. 557 (1990).
University of P a , 110 S. Ct. at 580.
Id. at 588-89.
See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 1 11-12 (criticizing

Id.
73 N.Y.2d 588, 540 N.E.2d 703, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1989).
Niesig, 7 6 N.Y.2d at 376, 558 N.E.2d at 1036, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
Id. at 372, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
Id. at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
Id.
Id. at 376, 558 N.E.2d at 1036-37, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499-500.
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ties should be limited to a "control group" of only those corporate
employees who are among the most senior management who exercise
substantial control over the corporation.497 Judge Bellacosa also emphasized that attorney-client communications are unaffected by the
Court of Appeals holding in the Niesig case.498
In Marte v. W.O. Hickol Manufacturing,499 the First Department
held that the plaintiff was entitled to the discovery of surveillance
videos taken in a personal injury action.500 The appellate division
rested its decision on the grounds that the plaintiff should be given an
opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the tapes prior to trial.
Nonetheless, the appellate division held that it is permissible to delay
the surveillance disclosure until after the defendant has had a full opportunity to depose the plaintiff.501 Thus, the testimony may be preserved for impeachment purposes at trial. In Spectrum Systems
International v. Chemical Bank,502 the First Department afErmed a
lower court's decision that documents prepared by a law firm for a
bank in the course of an investigation into allegations of fraud were
not protected by the attorney-client privilege.503 The appellate division reasoned that since the role of the law firm was that of an investigator retained to develop facts rather than to render legal opinions,
their work product was not exempt from discovery.504 The First Department also noted that to qualify as "litigation" material under
CPLR 3101(d)(2), documents must be prepared primarily, if not
solely, for litigation.505 In another interesting decision, the Appellate
Division for the Fourth Department held that CPLR 31 17(a)(2)506
does not apply when an adverse party seeks to use a deposed employee's deposition if the employer is no longer a party to the
action.
In Blank v. Eli Lilly,508 Justice Ira Gammerman was asked to

497. Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 376, 558 N.E.2d at 1036-37, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499-500.
498. Id. at 378, 558 N.E.2d at 1037, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
499. 154 A.D.2d 173, 552 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1st Dep't 1990).
500. Marte, 154 A.D.2d at 177, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 300.
501. Id.
502. 157 A.D.2d 444, 558 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1st Dep't 1990).
503. Spectrum Systems, 157 A.D.2d at 448, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. State University Construction Fund v. Kipphut & Newmann Co., Inc., 159
A.D.2d 1003, 1005, 552 N.Y.S.2d 471, 473 (4th Dep't 1990).
507. Id.
508. 204 N.Y.L.J. 45, Sept. 4, 1990, at 23 col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1990).
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determine if plaintiffs' family members' records were discoverable.
Justice Gammerman rejected the plaintiff's contention that the discovery of medical records of their mothers, fathers, siblings and other
In
family members was covered by the physician-patient pri~ilege.~Og
Sigman-Weiss Consultants v. Raif,slo Justice Spodek held that the
plaintiff in a fraud suit had the right to take its own deposition to be
used if the defendant, a man in poor health, expired before trial. The
deposition the plaintiff sought to take was one of its own partners who
claimed to have had conversations about the contested matter with
the defendant.511

A. Pleadings and Motions

In Ministers, Elders & Deacons of the Reformed Protestant Dutch
Church of the City of New York,512 the Court of Appeals for the first
time imposed sanctions under newly enacted Part 130 of the Uniform
Rules of the Court against a litigant for frivolous motion practice.513
The Court defined a motion as frivolous if it is completely without
merit in law or fact and cannot be supported by any reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.514 In
this respect, the practitioner is reminded that he must assert a jurisdictional defense in his CPLR 3211 motion or it will be waived.5l5
Similarly, if the defense is not asserted by motion or answer, it usually
cannot be asserted in an amended answer.s16 On the other hand, if
there is no merit to the defense, the practitioner may face sanctions
for filing a frivolous pleading.517 On a similar tack, a notice defect is
waived if not raised in an answer or by motion.518 Also, an attempt to

509. I d
510. 149 Misc.2d 111, 563 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1990).
51 1. Sigman- Weiss, 149 Misc. 2d at 112, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
512. 76 N.Y.2d 411, 559 N.E.2d 429, 559 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1990).
513. Ministers, Elders & Deacons, 76 N.Y.2d at 413, 559 N.E.2d at 430, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 867.
514. Id. at 414, 559 N.E.2d at 430, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
515. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 98 (citing Addesso v.
Shemtob, 70 N.Y.2d 689, 512 N.E.2d 314, 518 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1987)).
516. Id.
517. I d
518. See Sandoval v. New York, 147 Misc. 2d 1072, 559 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Ct. of
Claims 1990).
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amend a complaint, without leave of court, is a nullity.519
The Appellate Division for the Second Department, in an issue
of first impression, has ruled that a civil plaintiff's case should not be
summarily dismissed after his attorney's opening statement unless the
Thus if an
lawyer is given an opportunity to correct the deficien~y.5~~
opening statement fails to make out a prima facie case, the attorney
for the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to correct any deficiency in the opening.
In Sheridan v. Citicorp North A m e r i ~ a , petitioner
~~l
sought to vacate respondent's execution with notice to the garnishee. The trial
court held that petitioner merely presented an ailidavit and obtained
an order to show cause on it. Thus, instead of commencing a special
proceeding, he brought on a mere practice motion. This meant that
the court could not deem the papers to be pleadings and had to dis, ~ trial
~ ~ court dismissed a legal
miss the case. In Jimenez v. C h a s i ~the
malpractice case because when the suit was begun the underlying action commenced on plaintiff's behalf was not yet terminated. The
court held the suit was premature and noted that premature commencement of actions unneccesarily overburdened the ~ o u r t . 5 ~ ~

B.

Venue and Appeals

The most significant venue case decided during the Survey year is
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ferens v. John Deere.524 The
Court held that the law of the transferor forum applies when a diversity suit is transferred under 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a),525regardless
of who initiates the transfer. A Pennsylvania farmer lost his hand
when it became caught in a combine harvester made by the defendant.
Subsequent to the expiration of the Pennsylvania tort statute of limitations, plaintiff filed contract and warranty claims in a Pennsylvania
federal court. He later filed a tort suit in federal court in Mississippi
because that state had a six-year tort limitations period. He then
moved to transfer that suit to federal court in Pennsylvania and retain
the benefit of the Mississippi statute of limitations law. The U.S.

5 19. See Eustace v. Club Med, 204 N.Y.L.J. 98 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1990).
520. Devito v. Katsch, 157 A.D.2d 413, 556 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't 1990).
521. 204 N.Y.L.J. 36 (Nassau Co., Sup. Ct. 1990).
522. N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1990, at 24 col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1990).
523. Id.
524. 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990).
525. See 28 U.S.C. 5 1404(a) (1988).
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Supreme Court held that section 1404(a) transfers should not create
or increase forum shopping opportunities and that such transfers
should turn on considerations of convenience and the interest of justice, rather than the possible prejudice resulting from a change of
law.526 Thus the court held that any reward for the plaintiff's
manipulativeness is less repugnant than requiring suits in two for~ms.52~
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun dissented on the grounds that the court's rule would allow
plaintiffs to use the accident of diversity to obtain the application of a
different law within the state where they litigate, contravening the intent behind Erie Railroad v. Tomkins.528
The bar should be alert to the desire of the Court of Appeals to
encourage motions for amicus curiae relief. These motions must comply with the general rules governing motions in the Court of Appeals,
specifically Court of Appeals Rule 500.1 1 [a], PI, [c], and M.529 They
are also subject to specific rules set forth in section 500.11[e].530 In
1989 the Court of Appeals granted 78 of 99 motions for leave to file
an amicus brief.531

During 1990 Survey year, some decisions and other items of interest emerged that merit mentioning.

A.

Opting Out of Class Actions

In Woodrow v. Colt Industries,532 the Court of Appeals considered whether a Missouri corporation with no ties to New York had a
due process constitutional right to opt out of a New York class action
in which the relief sought was largely equitable in nature. The Court
held that when a class action complaint demands predominantly equitable relief that will necessarily benefit the class as a whole if granted,
the trial judge is not required to give class members the opportunity

526. Ferens, 110 S. Ct. at 1282.
527. Id. at 1284.
528. 304 U.S.64 (1938).
529. See Rule 500.1 1 [a], PI, [c] and [fl of the Court of Appeals Rules.
530. Id., Rule 500.1 1 [ e ] Z
531. See 1989 Annual Report of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals (on file with
Syracuse Law Review).
532. 77 N.Y.2d 185, 566 N.E.2d 1160, 565 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1990).
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to opt out of the

B. Law School Dismissals
Last year's Survey mentioned In re Susan "M9',534 where the Appellate Division for the First Department reversed a dismissal of petitioner's Article 78 proceeding on the grounds that law schools owe
students some kinds of safeguard against the possibility of arbitrary or
capricious error in grading exams before expelling students for academic deficiency. During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals ruled
unanimously not to add grading law school exams to its functions.535
Judge Alexander, speaking for the Court, held that a professor's evaluation of a law student's performance is beyond the scope of judicial
review unless the challenged determination was arbitrary and capricious, irrational and made in bad faith, or contrary to constitution or

C Arbitration Clauses
In Cowen & Co. v. Anderson,537the Court of Appeals ruled that a
standard arbitration clause in an agreement between Cowen & Co.
and an investor allowed the investor to take his complaint to the
American Arbitration A s s o ~ i a t i o n . ~ ~ ~
D. Legal Malpractice Claims
In Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe,539 the Court of
Appeals held that a law £irmmay not offset any malpractice award to
its former client by the amount it would have received as a contingency fee for the personal injury action.540 Judge Kaye, who concurred in the 4 to 3 decision, limited the holding to four essential
facts541 and thus left open the possibility that under different circumstances an offset would be proper.542
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.

Woodrow, 77 N.Y.2d at 195, 566 N.E.2d at 1165, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
76 N.Y.2d 241, 556 N.E.2d 1104, 557 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1990).
Susan "M",76 N.Y.2d at 243, 556 N.E.2d at 1105, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
Id. at 246, 556 N.E.2d at 1107, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 300.
76 N.Y.2d 318, 558 N.E.2d 27, 559 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1990).
Cowen & Co., 76 N.Y.2d at 322, 558 N.E.2d at 29, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
76 N.Y.2d 38, 555 N.E.2d 61 1, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1990).
Campagnola, 76 N.Y.2d at 39, 555 N.E.2d at 611, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
Id. at 45, 555 N.E.2d at 615, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
Id. at 46-47, 555 N.E.2d at 616, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
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E. Emotional Distress: First Appellate Ruling on Injury
In Lavanant v. General Accident Insurance Company of
America,543the Appellate Division for the First Department unanimously ruled that where an insurance policy defines bodily injury as
including sickness or disease, the scope of coverage includes the emotional and psychological effects of traumatic incidents covered by the
policy. Justice Sullivan, writing for the court, referred to cases from
other jurisdictions and stated that the First Department agreed with
the conclusions of those courts that expanded the scope of bodily injury beyond physical harm.544

E

Contingency Fees

In Beatie v. Del0ng,5~~
the Appellate Division for the First Department held that an attorney's contingency fee based on a percentage of revenues generated by patents that the attorney recovered for
his client was not impr0per.54~
G.

Claims by Terminated Law Firm Partners

A law firm partner who refused to change his "nine-to-five lifestyle" to conform with the rigorous demands of his firm had his claims
summarily dismissed on the grounds that he would be unable to prove
that he was wrongfully terminated from the firm.547 Also, terminated
law firm partners who seek damages under ERISA and RICO claims
can expect to have a summary judgment motion granted against
them."*

H. Law School Enrollments and Bar Examinations
Despite a weak economy, law school applications and enrollments continue to increase.549 Also, of the record 7,285 candidates
who took the July 24-25, 1990 state bar examination, 5,099 - or 70
percent - passed the exam. The 70 percent pass rate is touted as a
543. 164 A.D.2d 73, 561 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1st Dep't 1990).
544. Lavanant, 164 A.D. at 79-80, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
545. 164 A.D.2d 104, 561 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1st Dep't 1990).
546. Beatie, 164 A.D.2d at 109, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
547. See Reid v. Bickel, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16451 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
548. Clapp v. Greene, 743 F. Supp. 273, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
549. Adams, Local Law Schools Recent Rke in Applications, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 31,
1990, at 1, col. 3.
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record high.550

I. Small Claims Court Not Bound by Formal Procedure
the Civil Court of
In Rahman v. Elite Car & Limo Ser~ice,5~1
New York denied defendant's summary judgment motion and held
that section1804 of the Civil Court Act gave the Small Claims Court
great latitude to ignore procedural law in order to do substantial justice between the parties.

J. Special Masters
For many years the New York County Bar Association has selected voluntary special masters to assist Supreme Court judges in
Manhattan. In Schwartz v. Stecher Jaglom & Prutzman'552 plaintiff
moved to disqualify defendant's counsel because a member of his firm
served as a special master in Supreme Court.553 Plaintiff claimed a
conflict of interest existed that should have been disclosed.554 Justice
Baer found that special masters did not determine cases but were limited to discovery disputes and recommendations which the courts
were not bound to follow.555 Justice Baer stated that the special masters provide able help to a vastly overburdened Court and reminded
the bench and bar that "[m]embership in the bar is not supposed to be
simply a means to acquire wealth; it is also about service to the public
good and the fair administration of justice."556

We are again grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions
from our colleagues of the bench and bar and in academia. I am particularly thankful to the 1991 graduating classes of the Pace University School of Law and the Fordham University School of Law for
keeping me ever alert to new developments in New York Civil
Practice.
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